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ABSTRACT 
 
 Iran’s nuclear program continues to present a major challenge to U.S. policy.  At 
the core of this challenge is one fundamental question:  Is Iran attempting to build a 
nuclear weapon?  Objective analysis reveals that Iran’s dependence on oil and natural gas 
provides sufficient economic merit for Iran to pursue a peaceful nuclear program; without 
nuclear power to meet rising domestic energy needs, Iran’s economy will suffer.  Though 
the economic justification is valid, the security of Iran and the survival of its regime are 
overarching; acts of foreign interference in Iran’s affairs have fueled the regime’s quest 
for a nuclear weapon.  For this reason, U.S. administrations since the 1979 revolution 
have striven to derail Iran’s nuclear program through policies of containment, isolation, 
and denial of nuclear technology.  Considering the current standoff between Iran and the 
U.S., we must ask another key question:  How effective have U.S. policies been?  The 
answer is simple; Iran has made significant progress in its nuclear program.  Sanctions, 
political pressure, and threats proved no obstacle to Iran; worse still, ignoring IAEA and 
other’s reports that found no convincing evidence that Iran is building nuclear weapons 
damaged U.S. efforts significantly.  Iran’s progress makes it clear that U.S. policies have 
failed, and its strategies must be discarded in favor of a new approach.  This research 
implicates that a non-confrontational engagement policy, which acknowledges Iran’s 
needs to build a peaceful nuclear program will provide President Obama and the U.S. the 
highest probability of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran and the United States have been at 
odds with one another at nearly every turn.  Over the past three decades, there has been a 
tremendous amount of animosity between the two governments with few opportunities 
for the resumption of normal diplomatic relations.  When these opportunities did arise, 
though, those in power were not able to capitalize sufficiently.  Today, Iran and the 
United States stand at odds with one another once again, and this conflict has centered 
upon Iran’s nuclear program, its goals and motivations.   
 
The Walkthrough 
 The course of this research paper will cover all of the aspects of Iran’s nuclear 
program from its roots to present day, at least as close as to the publication date of this 
manuscript as possible.  Beginning with my research design in the following section, I 
will lay out my core questions along with the other principle elements of my research 
along with a very brief discussion of my methodology.  Most importantly, the research 
design section will present my hypothesis for this research. 
 Following this introduction, I will immediately begin a detailed description of the 
history of Iran’s nuclear efforts beginning from the 1950s.  This history will detail the 
origins of the program that received much cooperation from the west to support 
Mohammad Reza Shah.  Following the section on the Shah, I will describe the nuclear 
progress, and lack thereof, made by the revolutionaries following the Iranian Revolution.  
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This section will flow directly into our present day conflict with the current Iranian 
President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad which will attempt to bring the reader up to speed on 
some of the more current events in the Iranian program. 
 Immediately following a description of the history of the program, an analysis of 
two key justifications of the Iranian program will be in order.  Beginning with the 
economic reasoning behind the program, an explanation of the significance of oil in the 
Iranian economy will be in order along with why oil isn’t the answer to Iran’s energy 
woes that many believe that it is.  Continuing with the same theme, the discussion will 
flow to the argument over Iran’s vast natural gas reserves and why these reserves are also 
not the solution to Iran’s energy problems. 
 Following the economic justifications for Iran’s nuclear program, the research 
moves to the “security blanket” that the nuclear program provides to Iran.  This chapter 
will detail why this reasoning, though not necessarily comforting to those who fear a 
nuclear armed Iran, is sound and rational for Iran.  It details the history of foreign 
interference within Iran that has pushed Iran in this direction leaving them little choice 
but to protect the security of the state of Iran. 
 The following two chapters represent a breakdown of U.S. Presidential 
administration policies toward the Iranian nuclear program beginning with President 
Eisenhower all the way up to the current Obama administration.  The first of these two 
chapters focuses on each of the administrations prior to the 1979 Iranian revolution.  
After reading the history of the Iranian nuclear program; one should expect to see 
cooperation to be the name of the game between these Presidents and the Shah of Iran.  
The chapter which covers the Post-Revolutionary administrations certainly gives off a 
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very different feel which is absent of much cooperation.  These sections detail many of 
the efforts by the U.S. to derail Iran’s nuclear program at every turn.   
 Following the discussion of the U.S. policies, my conclusion will offer a review 
of my research questions, my hypothesis, and my discoveries in this research.  I will 
discuss my findings as well as whether or not I believe I provided sufficient evidence to 
prove my hypothesis.  This final chapter will present the implications and significance of 
this body of research; it will also detail areas of areas of research in this subject that may 
still be useful to the field. 
 Lastly, I will present my personal recommendations for breaching the existing 
stalemate over Iran’s nuclear program.  Not only will I discuss what I believe is critical to 
the United States’ own efforts, but I will also detail the steps that Iran must take to 
reassure the international community of its intentions.  Though not intended to be an all-
inclusive list of issues, I contend that my recommendations represent the most critical 
issues to be resolved for success to be had. 
 
Research Design 
 The speculation in the United States has been that Iran is definitively pursuing 
nuclear weapons.  It almost appears as if many in the media and the government have 
completely avoided the primary questions to be addressed herein.  So that there is no 
confusion up front, my hypothesis is that U.S. policies after the Iranian Revolution have 
been ineffective at haltingthe advancement of the Iranian nuclear program.  With this in 
mind, my primary research question is how effective have U.S. attempts been in altering 
Iran’s nuclear efforts.  In answering this question, it is important to also answer the 
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question as to how has the United States attempted to combat Iran’s efforts towards 
attainment of a nuclear program.  
 However, in understanding the answers to the first two questions, it is also critical 
that one be able to answer one of the other primary questions of this research.  Why is 
Iran pursuing a nuclear program?  Is it truly for peaceful purposes, or are their intentions 
designed to attain a military capability for their nuclear program?  In addressing this 
question we must examine the rationale behind Iran’s economic justifications.  What 
must also be examined are Iran’s claims of a civil and peaceful nuclear program; are they 
merely a front for the acquisition of nuclear weapons and added security?  Stated again; 
my hypothesis is that U.S. policies after the Iranian Revolution have enabled the 
advancement of the Iranian nuclear program. 
 The independent variable (IV) in this research could easily be considered to be 
plural rather than a singular variable; however, the IV is the United States’ policy 
towards Iran and its nuclear program.  In this sense, policy is defined as a program of 
actions adopted by a government.  Here, each U.S. administration had the opportunity to 
administer their own set of policies directed at the Iranian nuclear program.  
Unfortunately this is not a variable that can yield any legitimate or strong quantifiable 
data, its measurement will strictly be of a qualitative nature.  This variable will be 
examined through a look at specific U.S. strategies that came out of policies such as 
sanctions, political pressure, or military threats. 
 The dependent variable is the Iranian nuclear program.  This variable will be 
measured on multiple fronts to include cooperation with other states, technological 
advances, and all in all the overall progress of the program from 1979 forward.  This 
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variable can be measured through the number of centrifuges in operation, number of 
facilities operational, or even in the amount of enriched uranium produced indigenously, 
though this last indicator could be considered a byproduct of the number of centrifuges 
functioning.  Though these measurements will yield some quantifiable data, its analysis 
will also be qualitative in nature. 
 This research could be conducted as a comparative case study with two cases with 
a temporal comparison between U.S. policies pre and post-Iranian Revolution.  
Obviously these two cases would be split by the occurrence of the 1979 revolution, but 
because my objective is to examine the effectiveness of U.S. policies towards the Iranian 
nuclear program after the revolution, this research will be presented as an individual case 
study.  This study will have multiple units of analysis, though, where each U.S. 
administration and its own policy or policies towards Iran’s nuclear program will be 
examined.  The goal will be to demonstrate that the policies of the U.S. administrations 
after the 1979 Iranian Revolution have facilitated the advancement of Iran’s nuclear 
program. 
 I do expect a degree of contrast within this single case, and while John Stuart 
Mill’s most different method of comparison is meant for comparative case studies, it may 
prove useful within this individual case study when using it to examine the different 
administrations.  Mill states that, “the circumstance in which alone the two instances 
differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensible part of the cause, of the 
phenomenon."
1
  Although this style of case study proves extremely difficult to establish 
causality in the complex world of international relations, the objective of this research 
                                                             
1 Mill, John Stuart. “Two Methods of Comparison.” Comparative Perspectives: Theories and Methods, 
1970: 207. 
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will be to establish how critical, or in the words of Mill, “indispensable” the U.S. policies 
have been, and still are, in advancing the Iranian nuclear program in the post-
revolutionary period. 
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IRANIAN NUCLEAR HISTORY 
 
 The Iranian nuclear program has a lengthy and tumultuous history that extends 
back over fifty years and finds its roots in the 1950s.  This section will provide a detailed 
description of the facts that have brought the Iranian nuclear program to the position it is 
in now.  The program has been beset by problems of all kinds, but the political trouble 
which the Iranian nuclear program has found itself in today certainly carries its own irony 
when one looks back at its foundations.  A look at these facts may seem to indicate that 
the positions of those involved with the Iranian nuclear program have taken a complete 
180 degree turn from where they stood in the beginning and up until the Iranian 
revolution in 1979.  See table 1 for a summary of Iran’s nuclear history. 
 
The Shah’s Nuclear Ambitions 
 In the aftermath of World War II, Mohammad Reza Shah, the head of state of Iran 
from 1941-1977,  sought to obtain nuclear technology for Iran, and in the wake of the 
Mossadeq coup, the United States represented the stepping stone to nuclear technology 
that the Shah was seeking.  In 1957, the U.S. and Iran signed the Agreement for 
Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms after approximately two years of 
negotiating, and two years later, in 1959, the Shah announced the plans for Tehran 
University’s Nuclear Research Center that would be supplied with a five megawatt (MW)  
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Table 1: Summary of the Historical Evolution of Iran’s Nuclear Program  
Date Event  
1957  
U.S. and Iran sign Agreement for Cooperation 
Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms  
1967  
Tehran Nuclear Research Center completed; Iran 
receives 5.54kg enriched uranium from U.S.  
7/1/68  Iran signs Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)  
2/2/70  Iran ratifies the NPT  
1974  Atomic Energy Organization of Iran(AEOI) founded  
1974  Iran signs the IAEA Safeguards Agreement  
1974  
German firm Kraftwerk Union begins work on Bushehr 
nuclear reactor  
1974  
Iran signs contract with French firm Framatome to build 
Darkhovin nuclear reactors  
March 1975  
$15 billion agreement  with U.S. for construction of 
eight nuclear reactors  
1975  
AEOI signs contract with Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology for training of nuclear engineers.  
7/10/78  
Iran and U.S. signs U.S.-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement – 
grants “most favored nation” status to Iran for 
reprocessing of spent fuels  
1979  Shah’s government falls to Iranian Revolution  
1984-1987  Iraq bombs Bushehr reactor a total of six times  
1984  Esfahan Nuclear Research Center opens  
1985  Uranium mining in Yazd province begins  
 9 
 
Table 1: Summary of the Historical Evolution of Iran’s Nuclear Program (Cont)  
Date  Event  
1987  Iran signs agreement with Pakistan for training nuclear 
engineers  
1/8/1995  Iran signs $800 million agreement with Russia for 
completion of part of Bushehr reactor  
2002  Nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak discovered by the 
United States and publicly announced  
10/21/03  
Iran signs Sa’d Abaad agreement with EU-3; IAEA 
Additional Protocol enacted; Iran suspends uranium 
enrichment activity  
2004  Iran reportedly received support from Pakistani scientist 
A.Q. Khan  
11/15/04  Iran signs Paris Agreement with EU-3 extending Sa’d 
Abaad agreement  
June 2005  
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad elected to first term  
2009  Iran begins testing indigenously produced centrifuges 
termed IR-2 and IR-3  
September 
2009  
Discovery of Fordow Fuel Enrichment Facility announced 
by U.S. President Obama  
May 2010  Iran reaches agreement with Turkey and Brazil for 
nuclear fuel  
8/21/2010  Russia and Iran load fuel into the Bushehr nuclear 
reactor for the first time  
 
thermal research reactor purchased from the U.S.
2
  While it was announced that this 
research center would be built in 1959, it would require nearly eight years for the facility 
                                                             
2 Kibaroglu, Mustafa. “Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the 
West.” Middle Eastern Studies 43, no.2 (2007): 225. 
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to begin operations, and in 1967 the facility received 5.54 kilograms of enriched uranium, 
of which 5.16 kilograms were fissile isotopes capable of producing a nuclear bomb.
3
   
 Shortly after the startup of the Tehran reactor, the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), see Appendix 1, was available for signatures by states, and Iran signed the 
NPT on the first day, July 1, 1968.  The treaty was ultimately ratified by the Majles, the 
Iranian Parliament, on February 2, 1970.
4
  Four years after ratifying the NPT, Iran would 
sign the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement which, 
among other things, ensures that states must declare to the IAEA the existence of any 
facility no later than 180 days before introducing any nuclear materials into the facility.
5
  
Less than a year after signing the NPT, Iran would extend the cooperation agreement 
with the U.S. for 10 more years.  With this cooperation providing vital support, Iran 
could pursue more practical uses of nuclear power.  So in December of 1972, Iran’s 
Ministry of Water and Power started a feasibility study concerning the construction of 
nuclear power plants (NPP) in southern Iran.
6
 
 While the receipt of the equipment required for the operation of the nuclear 
reactor standing at Tehran University was a significant step in the Iranian nuclear 
program, Iran still lacked the indigenous knowledge to be self-sustaining.  However, 
there were hundreds of Iranian students enrolled in university nuclear programs 
                                                             
3 Sahimi, Muhammad. “Iran’s Nuclear Program. Part V.” Payvand’s Iran News. December 22, 2004. 
http://www.payvand.com/news/04/dec/1186.html (accessed July 23, 2010). 
 
4 Ibid. 
 
5 Sahimi, Muhammad. “When did Iran begin building the Qom nuclear facility?” September 29, 2009. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/09/when-did-iran-begin-building-the-qom-
nuclear-facility.html (accessed July 29, 2010). 
 
6 Sahimi, Mohammad. “Iran’s Nuclear Program. Part V.” 
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throughout Europe and the U.S., and by the early 1970s, these trained scientists were 
returning to Iran to establish nuclear research and development departments in their 
universities.
7
  Considering these newly established departments in Iranian universities, 
when the Shah finally made public his ambitious nuclear power program in 1974, there 
was a sufficient base of scientific knowledge available. 
 While many credit a 1974 Stanford Research Institute study that found that Iran’s 
need for energy would increase to 20,000 MW within 20 years, there can be little 
disputing the impact that the 1973 Yom Kippur War had in the Shah’s decision making 
process.  The spike in oil prices resulting from the OPEC boycott provided the Shah with 
a huge sum of currency that could provide the necessary monetary support for the nuclear 
expansion.  And in March of 1974, the Shah declared a goal of establishing 23,000 MWs 
of nuclear power in Iran “as soon as possible.”8  The resulting Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran (AEOI), founded after the Shah’s announcement, was led by Dr. 
Akbar Etemad who is today considered the father of the Iranian nuclear program; this 
organization took the lead in meeting the Shah’s goals for the nuclear program under the 
direction of the Shah.  The 1974 establishment of the AEOI also coincides with the Shah 
calling for a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (MENWFZ).
9
  
 The Shah’s ambitious plan resulted in Iran seeking numerous contracts for the 
construction of NPPs.  Two European states, Germany and France, were heavily involved 
                                                             
7 Kibaroglu, Mustafa. “Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran’s Quest for Nuclear 
Power.” Middle East Journal 60, no.2 (2006): 213. 
 
8 Sahimi, Muhammad. “Iran’s Nuclear Program. Part V.” Payvand’s Iran News. December 22, 2004. 
http://www.payvand.com/news/04/dec/1186.html (accessed July 23, 2010). 
 
9 Bahgat, Gawdat. “Nuclear Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran.” Iranian Studies. 39, no.3 (2006): 
309. 
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in the development of the Iranian nuclear program.  Both Germany and France were 
awarded contracts to build a total of eight NPPs, and their support did not stop there.  In 
1975, Iran was permitted to purchase a 10% share in Eurodif, a uranium enrichment 
company that was established among France, Belgium, Spain, and Italy. 
10
  Cooperation 
did not stop there; as mentioned previously many Iranian students traveled to Germany 
and France to pursue educations related to nuclear technology.  The AEOI also signed 
agreements with Germany for the purchase of uranium enrichment technology and 
nuclear fuel requirements.  Iran further expanded their program by signing agreements 
with South Africa for the acquisition of uranium yellowcake and the financing of an 
enrichment plant there; beneath all of these efforts was a quest for indigenous nuclear 
capability.
11
 
 The Shah’s efforts at securing his nuclear program through cooperation with the 
United States and others was a spectacular one; table 2 represents an extensive list of 
agreements reached for nuclear cooperation with Iran.  In March of 1975, a $15 billion 
agreement was reached for the construction of eight nuclear reactors that would provide 
Iran with a total of 8,000 MW of power.
12
  Additionally, in 1975, the AEOI signed a 
contract with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to train their nuclear engineers.
13
  
Throughout 1975 and 1976, Iran continued to negotiate with the U.S. in the areas of 
                                                             
10 Barnaby, Frank. How Nuclear Weapons Spread: Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s. London: 
Routledge, 1993, p 114-117. 
 
11 Bahgat, “Nuclear Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran,” p. 309. 
 
12 Kibaroglu, “Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran’s Quest for Nuclear Power,” 
p. 214. 
 
13 Sahimi, Mohammad. “Iran’s Nuclear Program. Part I: Its History.” Payvand’s Iran News.  October 3, 
2003. http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1015.html (accessed July 23, 2010). 
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uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities, but it was not until 1977 that another 
major agreement was made.  On April 12, 1977, Iran signed another agreement with the  
Table 2: Pre-1979 Agreements for Nuclear Cooperation with Iran  
Date  Event  
1957  
U.S.  signs Agreement for Cooperation Concerning 
Civil Uses of Atoms  
1969  
Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique (CEA) of France 
signs agreement to repair Tehran research reactor  
3/13/69  U.S. extends 1957 agreement for 10 years  
1974  
Iran agrees to loan $1 billion to CEA for uranium 
enrichment plant in France; receives 10% ownership  
June 1974  
France signs preliminary agreement to supply five 
1,000 MW reactors  to Iran  
June 1974  
U.S. and Iran reach provisional agreement to provide 
two nuclear reactors to Iran  
November 
1974  
German Kraftwerk Union (Siemens)  agrees to build 
two nuclear reactors at Bushehr  
November 
1974  
Agreement with French company Framatome  reached 
for two nuclear reactors at Bandar-e Abbas  
November 
1974  
Under previous two agreements; France and Germany 
agree to provide enriched uranium to Iran  
11/3/74  
U.S. and Iran agree to form U.S.-Iran Joint 
Commission for nuclear cooperation  
February 
1975  
India signs a nuclear cooperation agreement  
1976  
South Africa signs agreement to provide $700 million 
of uranium yellowcake  
4/12/77  
U.S. signs agreement for nuclear cooperation, 
technological exchanges, and safety  
10/3/77  Australia signs nuclear waste storage agreement  
 14 
 
Table 2: Pre-1979 Agreements for Nuclear Cooperation with Iran (Cont)  
Date  Event  
11/11/77  
Iran and German Kraftwerk Union sign agreement 
to build four nuclear reactors near Esfahan  
1/1/78  
U.S. President Carter and Shah agree on plan for 
Iran to purchase 6-8 nuclear reactors from U.S.  
7/10/78  U.S.-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement signed  
 
Source: Nuclear Threat Initiative (www.nti.org)  
 
U.S. to exchange nuclear technology and cooperate in the areas of nuclear safety, and 
months later on President Carter’s infamous trip to Tehran another bilateral agreement 
was made.  This agreement effectively granted Iran “most favored nation” 14  
 status for reprocessing of spent fuels (a very hot issue now) and announced the purchase 
of 6-8 light water reactors from the U.S.  Signed on July 10, 1978, this agreement became 
known as the U.S. – Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement, but the Shah put plans for his NPPs 
on hold as he sought to maintain power.  As the Islamic Revolution gained momentum, 
its leaders criticized the Shah for allowing so much foreign influence in Iran’s internal 
affairs.  Fearful of the direction of Iran in the event the Shah was removed from power, 
the U.S. halted the practice of supplying Iran with highly enriched uranium also.
16
  Once 
the Shah was ousted from power, the U.S. - Iran agreement was no more. 
 
 
                                                             
14 Sahimi, Muhammad. “Iran’s Nuclear Program. Part V.” 
 
16 Ibid. 
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The Post-Revolution Years 
 The Iranian Revolution represented a rejection of foreign and external influences 
within Iran; its leaders were intent on independence for Iran.  For the nuclear program, 
this meant that its progress would be reversed.  While both Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 
and Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan put a stop to efforts at the nuclear program, more 
importantly, the U.S., Germany, and France all halted support to the AEOI.  Khomeini’s 
infamous slogan of “Na Sharq, Na Gharb, Faqat Jumhuri-ye Islami” (Neither East, nor 
West, only the Islamic Republic) epitomized his rejection of the nuclear modernization 
efforts.  Further worsening the standing of Iran’s fledgling nuclear program was the flight 
of many scientists involved with Iran’s nuclear program.17 
 It required little time before the post-revolutionary leaders realized the mistake 
they had made in dismantling the nuclear program.  Though Iran’s two Bushehr reactors 
built by German firms were incomplete, Iraq bombed the site six times between 1984 and 
1987 subsequently destroying the entire core areas of both reactors.
18
  The sheer brutality 
of the Iran-Iraq War that included the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqis against 
Iranians opened the eyes of the revolutionary leadership to the utility of modern military 
technology.  The possession of this technology to include nuclear weapons would’ve 
likely deterred Iraq’s early aggression against Iran.19  It was during the early 1980s when 
President Hashemi Rafsanjani received the blessings of Khomeini to attempt to resume 
                                                             
17 Vaziri, Haleh. “Iran’s Nuclear Quest: Motivations and Consequences,” in Raju, G.C. Thomas, ed., The 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 315. 
 
18 Sahimi, “Iran’s Nuclear Program. Part I: Its History.” 
 
19 Vaziri, “Iran’s Nuclear Quest,” p. 316. 
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construction of the NPPs by Germany and France.  To the dismay of Rafsanjani, both the 
German and French firms refused to resume work, and once Iran realized that no support 
was likely to be provided by the West, it turned to alternative suppliers to support the 
nuclear program. 
 In 1984, the Iranian regime indicated a commitment to pursuit of a nuclear 
program with the opening of the Esfahan Nuclear Research Center; China provided 
support in the form of both fuel fabrication and conversion facilities necessary for 
uranium enrichment.
20
  Additionally, Iran found support from Pakistan with the signing 
of an agreement in 1987 which sent 39 Iranian nuclear scientists to Pakistan for training 
in Pakistani nuclear facilities.
21
  A mere three years later, in 1990, Iran would sign two 
more nuclear cooperation agreements, this time with the Russians and Chinese, and on 
January 8, 1995, after Iran had failed to secure support from other states to complete the 
Bushehr reactor, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy agreed to complete block one of 
the Bushehr reactor for $800 million.
22
  Though this agreement was signed nearly 15 
years ago, diplomatic and financial problems have prevented the reactor from becoming 
active on the electric grid until potentially later this year or in 2011.  Each of these 
agreements played critical roles in advancing the Iranian nuclear program. 
 Since this agreement with Russia, Iran’s nuclear program has been beset by 
numerous U.S. and United Nations’ sanctions attempting to prevent the acquisition of 
dual-use technology that could support both peaceful and military applications of nuclear 
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technology.  The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, subsequently renamed the Iran 
Sanctions Act in 2006, put major restrictions on significant investments in the Iranian 
energy sector.  However, the election of the reformist President Khatami in 1997 opened 
the door for other states to make lucrative nuclear sales to Iran despite the sanctions. 
23
 
 Despite the sanctions, the Iranian nuclear program made substantial progress 
through the late 1990s and early into the 21
st
 century.  In 2002, the progress of the Iranian 
program was revealed through the discoveries of two nuclear facilities previously 
unknown.  The uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and the heavy water production 
facility at Arak were announced in a press conference in Washington, D.C. by an Iranian 
resistance movement.
24
  As a result, Iran’s nuclear program came under increased 
scrutiny from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and it was revealed in 
2004 that the now infamous rogue Pakistani scientist, A.Q. Khan, had provided extensive 
support, to include providing Pakistani centrifuges and designs, to the Iranian nuclear 
program. 
25
 
 When the IAEA concluded their inspections they detailed a series of previously 
unknown advancements and facilities within the Iranian nuclear program.  Iran 
subsequently conceded that the plants at Natanz and Arak were not alone; another plant 
was also under construction in Esfahan in order to convert yellowcake into enriched 
uranium.
26
  Advancements in their nuclear program included efforts in laser isotope 
separation which can enrich uranium as well as the revelation that Iran had begun mining 
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their own uranium ore
27
 from the more than 5,000 metric ton of deposit discovered in 
1985 in eastern Yazd province.
28
   
 In the aftermath of the IAEA inspections, on October 21, 2003, Iran signed the 
Sa’d Abaad Agreement with the EU-3 which amounted to Iran signing the IAEA 
Additional Protocol and agreeing to voluntarily suspend uranium enrichment activity.
29
 
Note that by being a signatory to the NPT, Iran was already subjected to the 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements in accordance with the NPT and IAEA, and 
though the Additional Protocol is not a requirement, the IAEA is “mandated with the task 
of timely detection of the diversion of significant quantities of fissile material from 
peaceful to military purposes in the non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to the 
NPT.”30  To put it simply, the Additional Protocol represents a “strengthened safeguards 
measure” designed to give the IAEA expanded access to both nuclear related information 
and declared / undeclared nuclear facilities, but without ratification, Iran is not obligated 
to adhere to it.
31
  As stated above, the Sa’d Abaad Agreement enacted the Additional 
Protocol in Iran, but in agreeing to this, few incentives were given to Iran.  In exchange 
for Iran pledging to “refrain from developing fissile material,” the EU-3 conceded Iran’s 
right to pursue a peaceful nuclear program and agreed to provide “technical assistance 
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and good will.”32 So why did Iran choose to sign the agreement when so little was given 
in return? 
 First, the intense pressure resulting from the identification of the facilities in 
Natanz and Arak and other advancements played a role in Iran signing the IAEA’s 
Additional Protocol, but there was one other factor that was likely more critical.  The 
U.S. only months earlier had quickly decimated Saddam Hussein’s army in a coalition 
victory in Iraq.  Considering that President George W. Bush had placed Iran squarely into 
his Axis of Evil, Iran was fearful that they were next on the hit list.  American troops 
were now positioned in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and U.S. naval carriers were well 
within striking distance in the Persian Gulf supporting U.S. operations in the region.  
Additionally, the fact that President Bush had used the perception that Saddam was 
developing nuclear weapons as his central justification for the Iraq War certainly put the 
Iranian leaders on notice that the same could be done for them.  At that point in time the 
U.S. and coalition were still searching for evidence of Saddam’s weapons program; few 
thought that it would turn out that there was no Iraqi nuclear program.  So one could 
make the argument that Iran’s leaders were in such a position that they had no choice but 
to sign the Sa’d Abaad agreement and cooperate in order to avert a military strike. 
 Ultimately, with the institution of the Additional Protocol inspections the Iranian 
program was not found in violation of the NPT by the IAEA as inspections found no 
evidence of illegal nuclear activities.
33
  Additionally, Iran continued negotiating with the 
EU-3 (Britain, France, and Germany) in regards to potential economic and political 
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incentives that could prevent the development of nuclear weapons in Iran.  After just over 
a year of negotiations, the EU-3 and Iran signed on November 15, 2004 what is known as 
the Paris Agreement.  This agreement effectively extended the suspension that Iran’s 
nuclear program had agreed to under the Sa’d Abaad agreement while the negotiations 
between the EU-3 and Iran were underway.  This temporary agreement included all 
enrichment related and reprocessing activities, the manufacturing and importing of 
centrifuges and their components, and any work on plutonium separation.
34
  More 
important in this agreement was an affirmation of Iran’s inalienable rights to possess 
nuclear technology for peaceful civilian usage in accordance with Article IV, as shown in 
Appendix 1, of the NPT.  As stated above, this agreement was temporary while the EU-3 
and Iran negotiated over a set of incentives designed to ensure that Iran was not on the 
path to develop nuclear weapons, and despite the exchanges of several proposals between 
the EU-3 and Iran over the nuclear program, no further agreements were reached.   
 
The Ahmadinejad Era 
 So in 2005 with the election of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the 
confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program accelerated.  But how could Iran move from 
such a weak position in 2003 to a stronger more assertive position in 2005?  First of all, 
the IAEA had not discovered any smoking gun pointing to an Iranian nuclear weapons 
program; so the U.S. justifications for the Iraq War could not be applied to Iran and 
Ahmadinejad.   Additionally, U.S. forces were tied up in a resurgent insurgency in Iraq, 
and casualties in Afghanistan were even on the rise; with American citizens increasingly 
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expressing disapproval over the war in Iraq, President Bush not only didn’t have the 
political capital to strike Iran but was also unprepared for potential consequences.
35
   
 Another major factor in Ahmadinejad’s confrontational behavior was the state of 
the oil market at the time.  With oil prices on the rise, any confrontation between the U.S. 
and Iran would only serve to drive prices higher and damage the U.S. economy.  OPEC 
was at nearly maximum production capacity; replacing lost Iranian oil due to a conflict 
was unlikely.  Iran, who possessed little foreign debt at the time,  ~$10 billion, was rather 
well insulated from any conflict.
36
   
 Additionally, Iran was also gaining the support of other regional powers.  China 
and India had recently signed oil and natural gas contracts with Iran for in excess of $100 
billion, and China had also invited Iran to be an observer to the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization which includes China and Russia.
37
  This organization represented 
additional political support to the Ahmadinejad regime.   
 Each of these pieces provides ample explanation to Ahmadinejad’s belligerent 
attitude towards the West.  He was in a very strong position, and he was well aware of it.  
And when Iran’s nuclear dossier was referred to the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) on February 4, 2006,
38
  President Ahmadinejad stated that Iran would ignore any 
UNSC “political” resolution and would regard issues of the Iranian nuclear programs as 
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“technical” ones to be discussed with the IAEA.39 Ahmadinejad even went so far as to 
refer to the Iranian nuclear program as a “train without brakes.”40 
 Throughout 2007 and 2008, Iran continued to advance its nuclear program.  By 
August of 2007, Iran was operating nearly 3,000 centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel 
Enrichment Plant (FEP).
41
  However, as of September 2007, some analysts argued that 
the plant was beset by technical difficulties as relatively small amounts of uranium 
hexafluoride (UF6) had been used in the centrifuge cascades indicating their performance 
was subpar.  David Albright, an analyst from the Washington based Institute for Science 
and International Security (IISS), commented that, “Iran likely has managed to learn how 
to operate individual centrifuges and cascades adequately.  However, it still may be 
struggling to operate a large number of cascades at the same time in parallel.”42   
 By the end of 2008, Iran’s nuclear program resolved the majority of their 
technical problems concerning centrifuge operations ensuring the units would spin at the 
proper speeds and for the necessary amounts of time to produce enriched uranium, and 
the facilities would begin to function at or near their intended capacity.  The Natanz FEP 
was then operating approximately 3,800 P1 centrifuges which had been designed by 
Pakistan with two additional cascades of up to 2,100 and 3,000 P1 centrifuges expected 
to come online in 2009; two more centrifuge cascades were also under construction as of 
                                                             
39 Nicoll, Alexander and Delaney, Jessica. “Nuclear Iran: How close is it?” Strategic Comments 13, no.7 
(2007). http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-13-2007/volume-13-issue-
7/nuclear-iran/?locale=en  (accessed July 14, 2010). 
 
40 Chubin, Shahram. “The Iranian Riddle after June 12.” The Washington Quarterly. 33, no.1 (2009): 167. 
 
41 Ibid. 
 
42 Ibid. 
 
 23 
 
early 2009 at the Natanz FEP. 
43
  Though there are some disputes over the number of 
centrifuges in operation in Iran, the nuclear program has progressed very rapidly over the 
past few years.  Shahram Chubin contends that it has advanced from 164 centrifuges in 
2003 to approximately 8,000 in mid-2009,
44
 and Muhammad Sahimi stated that the 
Natanz facility was reported by the Iranians to have the capability to house as many as 
55,000 centrifuges.
45
  However, Iran Watch.org lists different numbers for Iranian 
centrifuge progress.  Figure 1 below shows the gap that exists between experts in how far 
along Iran truly is, but there is still no disputing the extensive progress made.
46
 
 In addition to the fact that the operation of the plant has progressed, other aspects 
of the nuclear program have also advanced.  As stated earlier, the centrifuges which Iran 
first put to use came directly from Pakistan through the A.Q. Khan network.  Known as 
the P1 and P2 centrifuges, these centrifuges have comprised the majority of Iran’s fuel 
enrichment cascades.  However, as of early 2009, Iran had begun testing their own next 
generation of centrifuges: the IR-2, IR-3, and potentially a longer centrifuge.
47
  Each of 
these centrifuges are projected to have a much greater enrichment output while also 
outperforming Iran’s current centrifuges, the P1.48  If successful, these indigenous Iranian 
                                                             
43 Albright, David and Shire, Jacqueline. “Nuclear Iran: Not Inevitable.” Institute for Science and 
International Security.  January 21, 2009: 7. 
 
44 Chubin, “The Iranian Riddle after June 12,” p. 167. 
 
45 Sahimi, Muhammad. “Double Standards for Iran’s Nuclear Program.” December 2, 2009. 
http://original.antiwar.com/sahimi/2009/12/01/double-standards-for-irans-nuclear-program/  (accessed July 
28, 2010). 
 
46 Iran Watch. Iran’s Nuclear Timetable. September 9, 2010. 
http://www.iranwatch.org/ourpubs/articles/iranucleartimetable.html (accessed September 29, 2010). 
 
47 Albright and Shire, “Nuclear Iran: Not Inevitable,” p. 8. 
 
48 Albright and Shire, “Nuclear Iran: Not Inevitable,” p. 8. 
 
 24 
 
centrifuges will certainly replace the P1 and provide Iran with larger amounts of low 
enriched uranium faster than before. 
Figure 1: Number of Centrifuges Deployed Over Time 
 
Source: Iran Watch.org 
 In September of 2009, President Obama announced publicly that the U.S. had 
used overhead satellites to observe Iran building the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Facility for 
nearly five years in the mountains near the holy city of Qom.
49
  While Iran claimed that 
the facility had already been disclosed to the IAEA, the pressure resulting from this find 
again placed Iran at the negotiating table.  Iranian officials met with the five permanent 
members of the UNSC plus Germany (P5 + 1) in Geneva to discuss the program, and on 
October 1, 2009 Iran’s representatives tentatively agreed to a proposal sending 75% of its 
LEU to Russia for enrichment to 19.75% which would then be sent to France to be 
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converted into fuel rods that cannot be used for military applications.
50
  The proposal also 
permitted inspection of the Fordow facility by the IAEA, which was inspected with no 
issues, but when the October agreement went to the Iranian government for approval, it 
was rejected outright by Supreme Leader Khamene’i and Foreign Minister Mottaki who 
proposed a simultaneous exchange of LEU and fuel rods that was rejected by the P5 + 
1.
51
  Just a few months later in May of 2010, Iran’s nuclear program, supported by Brazil, 
reached an agreement with Turkey that strongly resembled the initial proposal by the P5 
+ 1.  Iran will ship over half of its stockpile of LEU to Turkey for further enrichment and 
conversion to fuel rods.
52
 
 Most recently, on August 21
st
, 2010, a new era dawned in the Iranian nuclear 
program.  The Russians began loading fuel into the Bushehr nuclear reactor.  While this 
does not immediately place the reactor into an operational mode, it represents a critical 
point in the Iranian program that took decades to achieve.  If Iran can overcome some 
new problems within the plant which will be discussed later, Iran will have its first 
nuclear power plant online and connected to the electricity grid likely within six to seven 
months, and other reactors will soon follow.   
 While the recent history of the Iranian nuclear program is a very confrontational 
one, we must not forget that the program originated from the U.S. and Europe.  The state 
of the program today represents as near an indigenous capability as Iran has ever had.  
While Iran desires to possess the complete nuclear cycle, they have conveyed throughout 
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history that they are not committed to nuclear weapons.  Despite this, does Iran have a 
real need, economic or security related, to possess the nuclear cycle?  That is the subject 
to be addressed in the following chapter. 
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ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS 
 The debate over Iran’s reasons for obtaining nuclear technology ranges from 
economic to security to the desire to possess nuclear weapons.  This chapter will be 
focusing solely on the economic justifications, though some individuals have argued that 
Iran has no legitimate economic reason to have a civilian nuclear program.  This 
argument generally posits that the significant oil and natural gas reserves that Iran 
possesses as national resources render the need for nuclear power marginal at best.  These 
individuals argue that Iran’s claim that the program is for peaceful purposes is easily 
tossed aside when one takes a look at Iran’s huge reserves of oil and gas; thus the true 
purpose of the Iranian nuclear program can only be the development of nuclear weapons.  
Neoconservatives such as Michael Ledeen, Richard Perle, and Andrew McCarthy are 
largely responsible for this argument and rationale; they believe “that the Iranians know 
what they want: nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.” 53  Kenneth Pollack 
goes so far as to argue that Iran’s failure to declare the previously mentioned facilities in 
Natanz and Arak to the IAEA “made it clear that they were for military purposes; there 
was no other plausible reason for having concealed them.” 54 
 While many of these individuals argue over the perceived intentions of the Iranian 
regime, an objective look at the economic figures surrounding Iran’s energy sector and 
nuclear program are extremely revealing.  There are several indicators that present a 
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glaring picture of the Iranian need for energy sources at the present time.  To obtain a 
thorough understanding, one must look at population growth, domestic energy 
consumption rates, and oil and natural gas production rates.  However, what is just as 
important is to understand how reliant the Iranian economy is upon their oil and natural 
gas export revenues. 
 Iran’s population has nearly doubled since 1974 to the current 70 million of which 
approximately 70% are under the age of 30, and projections have the population 
potentially growing to 100 million by the year 2025.
55
  These figures alone demonstrate 
an ever increasing need for energy sources within Iran; between 1977 and 2003, sources 
show that Iran’s domestic energy consumption rate has increased at a rate of 5.5% per 
year. 
56
   
 
The Importance of Iranian Oil 
Statistics from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) demonstrate the 
growing economic problem in Iran that is tied to energy.  In 1980, Iran’s domestic oil 
consumption was a mere 590,000 barrels per day (BPD), but in 2009, this figure had risen 
to just over 1.8 million BPD.  Yet while the consumption has more than tripled, the 
production rates have lagged and risen by only about 150% from 1.7 million BPD in 
1980 to just under 4.2 million BPD in 2009; see figure 2.
57
   
                                                             
55 Sahimi, Muhammad. “Iran’s Nuclear Energy Program. Part IV: Economic Analysis of the Program.” 
Payvand’s Iran News.  December 7, 2004.  http://www.payvand.com/news/04/dec/1056.html (accessed 
July 23, 2010). 
 
56 Ibid. 
 
57 U.S. Energy Information Administration. Iran Energy Profile. July 14, 2010.  
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=IR (accessed August 10, 2010). 
 
 29 
 
Figure 2: Iran's Petroleum Production and Consumption 
 
 
 I contend that a look at two rankings paint a stark picture of the economic and 
energy problems in Iran; according to the EIA, Iran ranks 4
th
 in the world in oil 
production as of 2008.  Despite this lofty ranking, Iran’s petroleum Net Export/Import 
ranking is 198
th
 in the world; Iran nets just over 2.4 million BPD compared to the Middle 
East average of 19 million BPD and OPEC’s 28.1 million BPD.58  These rankings reveal 
significant problems for a state overwhelmingly dependent upon oil revenue. 
 Iran must also contend with being an OPEC member as they are subjected to 
production quotas.  Iran’s total production of 4.2 million BPD is barely enough to cover 
their OPEC quota of 3.817 million BPD.
59
  As a result, Iran must import many oil 
products, including gasoline, for domestic consumption.  The government in the past 
spent nearly $6 billion per year on importing and subsidizing gasoline
60
 for its 
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increasingly gasoline hungry public; however, recent efforts to curb domestic gasoline 
consumption through government controlled price increases via subsidy reduction and 
rationing resulted in an 8 percent reduction in gasoline imports from 2008 to 2009.
61
  
This rationing system also reduced private motorist gasoline quotas from 26 
gallons/month (g/m) to 21 g/m in December 2009, and there is a possibility of further 
reductions to 16 g/m.
62
  As an effort to save revenue and combat sanctions, Iran’s 
rationing system has reduced domestic gasoline consumption by nearly 20 percent since 
January 2010, but Iran has still spent nearly $10 billion on gasoline imports since 2008 as 
it does not have sufficient refining capacity to meets its domestic consumption 
requirements.
63
      
 Considering that a study in 1998 revealed that 57 of Iran’s 60 oil fields were in 
need of major repairs, upgrading, or repressurizing by natural gas,
64
 the likelihood for 
Iran to see a significant increase in production on the horizon is unlikely.  In fact, the 
combination of the Iran-Iraq War, lack of investment, sanctions and the natural decline of 
the oil fields have eroded production; it is estimated that between 400-700,000 BPD is 
lost annually and will not be recovered without significant structural upgrades.
65
  A 2005 
report by the International Energy Agency noted that Iran required an estimated $75 
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billion in oil infrastructure investments between the years 2004-2030 in order to sustain 
oil production and refining.
66
   
 Looking at the projected power requirements for Iran, by projected growth rates 
of 7-9 percent it is conceivable that Iran will require 70,000 megawatts (MW) of power in 
2021 up from the current installed capacity of approximately 43,000 MW.
67
  For each 
1,000 MW of power to be produced by oil, it requires approximately 20-25 million 
barrels per year; if one uses the price of a barrel of oil in 2010, around $75/barrel, Iran 
stands to lose $1.5 to 1.875 billion/year per for every 1,000 MW of electricity produced 
by oil.
68
 To be more precise, oil provides 18% of Iran’s current electricity which equates 
to 112-140 million barrels per year for the 2021 projections
69
; if oil were to 
hypothetically remain at $75/barrel (which is unlikely), Iran would be losing $8.4 to 10.5 
billion/year in total revenue.  These figures alone should provide ample economic 
justification for Iran’s pursuit of civilian nuclear power. 
 As stated earlier, Iran has been and continues to undergo significant growth.  
While electricity production has witnessed approximately 8.5% in annual growth 
between 1977 and 2001, the electricity consumption rate has been outpacing it at 8.8%. 
70
  
Additionally, as mentioned above, Iran’s oil consumption rate is also outpacing the 
production rates.  It is not difficult to understand that this predicament could lead to Iran 
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becoming a net importer of oil in the coming years. Considering that oil makes up 80% of 
Iran’s total export earnings, 45% of Iran’s annual budget and 15% of the GDP, becoming 
a net importer of oil would be devastating to the Iranian state, its economy, and its 
citizens.
71
  These figures alone present a plausible and understandable case for the 
acquisition of civilian nuclear technology. 
 The fact is that Iran is heavily dependent upon oil revenues for their government 
revenues, and the fluctuation of oil prices over the past 30 years has increased the 
importance of the development of nuclear power plants.  A study produced by the 
International Monetary Fund in 2008 demonstrates the effects of oil pricing on Iran’s 
economy; it states that oil sector fluctuations caused government revenues to range 
between 25 and 73 percent between 1986 and 1994.
72
  Figure 3 shown below paints a 
strong picture of oil’s role in the Iranian economy from the 1960s to 2006.  To cope with 
the volatility of the oil sector, Iran created the Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF) in the year 
2000 with the Third Five-Year Development Plan (2000-2005).  Its goal was to “stabilize  
the government’s annual budgets” by ensuring that “all excess oil revenue should be 
deposited in the OSF; the central government could draw from the OSF account if the 
government’s oil export receipts fell short.”73  As oil prices began to rise in the last 10 
years, Iran saw significant increases in their oil revenues and chose to use this revenue to  
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Figure 3: The Role of Oil in Iran's Economy
 
 
foster economic development through loan programs and pay for gasoline imports.  The 
IMF report commended Iran for their OSF and stated that their “savings are particularly 
justified…because of the lack of access to international financial markets.”74  
 
The Natural Gas Myth 
 As for Iran’s natural gas capacity, considered to be the 2nd largest reserves in the 
world, Iran already uses gas to cover more than 75% of their energy needs.
75
  The gas 
that Iran is not using to power their electric plants is being used for a process known as 
secondary recovery where the gas is injected into oil reservoirs to increase oil production 
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by several thousand barrels per day; this process takes up 35 to 40 percent of the 4.1 
billion cubic feet of gas that Iran produces each year.
76
  More importantly, the revenue 
from these several thousand barrels per day or more of oil would not only pay for a 
nuclear reactor but also cover part of its annual operating cost ($140 million/yr) hence 
placing it on par with the operations costs of a gas power plant ($60-70 million/yr) but 
without the pollution costs.
77
   
 The argument, and what I consider to be a myth, that Iran has such unlimited 
natural gas reserves that it does not require nuclear power cannot withstand an objective 
analysis.  According to the study done by the EIA in 2008, Iran was already operating 
with a negative Net Export/Import in natural gas by 94 billion cubic feet.
78
  And while 
Iran does have the 2
nd
 largest proven reserves as mentioned above, they are only the 4
th
 
largest producer of natural gas, but at the same time, they are the 3
rd
 largest consumer.
79
  
The ongoing development of the South Pars gas field represents a tremendous economic 
windfall for the Iranians; not only will it earn approximately $11 billion/yr for 30 years or 
more, it has also brought extensive foreign investment and more than 30,000 jobs to 
Iran.
80
 
 With all of these figures staring the Iranian government in the face, how can Iran 
not be expected to pursue civilian nuclear technology?  Without it, their country will face 
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severe economic challenges; without nuclear power, their economic fate is undeniable.  
The irony is that in the 1970s when there was no genuine need for nuclear power in Iran 
states such as the U.S., Germany, and France were encouraging the Shah to go nuclear.  
But now that there is a legitimate need, at least one that is agreed to by objective parties, 
the U.S. and others aren’t listening to Iran’s explanation.  The economic rationale is 
crystal clear because Iran must generate revenues through the sales of their fossil fuels.
81
  
The choice is obvious, and the Iranians must move ahead with nuclear power now or risk 
the future survival of their state.  Simply considering the finite nature of fossil fuels for 
which Iran is so dependent upon for revenue and energy, Iran must view acquisition of 
civilian nuclear power as vital.  With the future of the Iranian economy dependent upon 
the outcome of the nuclear program, it should come as no surprise that the Iranian 
“population is 90% in favor of nuclear power.”82 
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IRAN’S NUCLEAR SECURITY BLANKET 
 Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology and weapons in the interests of security 
should be regarded as an effort to deter potential adversaries from interfering in their 
sovereign affairs, to include regime change, as they have fallen victim to the acts of 
external actors for greater than two centuries.  However, while the economic reasoning to 
support the nuclear program is very strong, the issue of national security is one that is 
overarching.  Those that are in power in Iran believe that the Islamic Republic’s survival 
is dependent on the preservation of the regime and their revolutionary ideology; 
acquisition of nuclear technology is meant to secure both.  As Iran’s future prospects for 
their economy are very troubling in the absence of nuclear power, the security of the 
regime and state would surely be degraded given the extreme domestic conditions likely 
to ensue.  So the pursuit of the nuclear program that receives widespread nationalist 
support throughout Iran is critical to preserving the economic future and physical security 
of the Iranian state for future generations. 
 The security reasons behind the Iranian nuclear developments may be even more 
significant to the Iranian leadership than the economic despite the obvious importance of 
the economic consequences of not turning to nuclear power.  Iran’s foreign policy 
strategy, of which the nuclear program plays a key role, should be regarded as an attempt 
to “secure its geostrategic interests and national security concerns.”83  The Iranian nuclear 
program has become a key component in the security and survival of the Iranian regime; 
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Iran has invested far too much in its progress to turn back now.  The Islamic Revolution 
promised independence, freedom, and an Islamic Republic, but it has failed to deliver on 
the latter two conditions; the only winning card the regime has remaining is its 
independence which remains characterized by anti-Americanism.
84
  “Iran cannot give in 
on their nuclear policy.”85 
 Iran has a long history of lessons learned in dealing with foreign armies and 
governments interfering in their affairs.  The 19
th
 century witnessed two defeats at the 
hands of the Russians who imposed humiliating treaties on the Iranians; the Treaties of 
Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchay (1828) forced Iran to give up sovereign territory and 
make economic concessions to the Russians.
86
  Russia and Britain’s 1907 agreement to 
divide Iran into spheres of influence has also been a factor in the Iranian culture.  The 
overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadeq by the British and Americans in order to place the 
Shah back in power is perhaps the pinnacle of foreign interference in Iranian affairs.  The 
point of these instances is to convey how all of this has molded Iran into a “profoundly 
conspiratorial culture” where “generations have been raised with this mindset of 
interference.”87   One might argue that the 1979 hostage crisis was a result of this 
conspiratorial culture as the Iranians viewed the American acceptance of the Shah into 
the U.S. for medical treatment was a cover for the plot to put the Shah back into power in 
Iran. 
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 This “mindset of interference” has penetrated Iranian culture and the regime 
leadership, and it has a definitive impact on the regime’s decision making process.  
Looking at today’s landscape in the Middle East, Iran sees U.S. military forces in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan as a precursor to a potential attack against Iranian soil in an effort to 
overthrow the regime and dismantle the nuclear program.  The rhetoric against Iran over 
the pursuit of its nuclear program has gradually intensified over the past decade, and the 
Axis of Evil speech issued by President Bush in 2002 did little to diminish the beliefs that 
Iran was a potential target of the West.  This mindset was visible in the aftermath of the 
2009 elections as the Iranians accused the British of meddling in their election process 
and fostering protests; the legacy of British interference in Iran still lives.
88
  The fact is 
that these incidents throughout Iranian history explain why there is such a sense of 
national insecurity.
89
 
 Iran has also been at odds with states in the Middle East and the West since the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979, and the eight year war with Iraq solidified to the Iranians that 
the international community could not be counted on to come to their aid in war.  When 
the Iraqis unleashed chemical weapons on both Iranian troops and citizens, no Middle 
Eastern state or the west objected once to the Iraqi actions.  Over the past decade, U.S. 
actions in the region have done little to lessen Iranian concerns about their security.  The 
American victory over Iran’s long time nemesis, Saddam Hussein, threw off the Middle 
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East’s balance of power between Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran; in Henner Furtig’s words 
it, “initiated a political earthquake….that threw the power system into doubt entirely.”90 
 Iran’s security in the region is also threatened by the fact that it has been the lone 
Shi’ite state in the Middle East; though Iraq is predominantly Shia also, before the 
disposal of Saddam the Sunni-led Baath Party controlled Iraq.  Their backyard is a very 
unstable one which continually witnesses sectarian strife and conflict, possesses failed or 
potentially failing states (Afghanistan and Pakistan) and authoritarian governments 
throughout the Persian Gulf; all of these factors and more have influenced Iran’s 
perception of insecurity.
91
  Their pursuit of nuclear technology represents a step towards 
added security against these external threats in the region.  Iran understands that a nuclear 
weapon or even the perception of the capability to produce a nuclear weapon is the truly 
the only effective strategic deterrent. 
 Iran is well aware of how nuclear capabilities have bolstered other states’ national 
security such as Russia, the U.S., and Britain; it is argued by Dr. Nasser Saghafi-Ameri of 
the Center for Strategic Studies in Tehran that, “the American, European, and Russian 
doctrines stress the value of nuclear weapons in national and collective defense 
strategies.”92  He contends that U.S. unilateralism and the use of nuclear weapons as a 
mode of “political blackmail” have fed the nuclear arms race as the vulnerability and 
insecurity of non-nuclear weapons states has substantially increased.
93
  In Iran’s case the 
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acquisition of nuclear capabilities can also be viewed as a “means of offsetting Iran’s 
weaknesses in conventional weapons because of financial constraints and its lack of 
access to good suppliers” due to persistent sanctions.94  The possession of nuclear 
weapons by states who are not allies with Iran in their immediate vicinity – Israel and 
Pakistan – heightens Iran’s desire for nuclear weapons.  Additionally, the nuclear 
umbrella of NATO and the U.S. extend to other regional countries such as Turkey, Egypt, 
and Saudi Arabia of which only Turkey could be considered neutral, or even receptive, to 
the Iranian pursuit of nuclear technology.   
 Israel perhaps represents the greatest threat to Iranian security in the region 
though they would likely be considered to be reliant upon the U.S. for political backing.  
The two states are at odds over the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Israel 
places much of the blame for hostilities carried out by Hamas and Hizbollah on the 
shoulders of the Iranian leadership.  Though undeclared and not a signator to the NPT, 
Israel is regarded as a nuclear power, and therefore Iran is threatened by the harsh 
rhetoric emanating from the Israeli leadership.  Israel’s nuclear status, though undeclared, 
“has been the foremost incentive for the Arab world and Iran to embark upon developing 
their own equalizers” which includes the development of nuclear weapons.95  Fearful of 
military action by the Israeli forces, Iran views the development of nuclear weapons as a 
deterrent to aggression from not just the Israelis but also from other Western states. 
 Regardless of what the true intentions are, there will be consequences in the 
region when Iran goes nuclear, which technically began on August 21, 2010 when Russia 
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loaded fuel into the Bushehr reactor.  It is important for the United States, and other states 
around the world, to understand how Iran’s crossing of the nuclear threshold will impact 
the balance of power in such a volatile and important region of the world.  The U.S. and 
the world must act to find a fair solution to the concerns of all, including Iran; if not, the 
consequences could be severe. 
 
  
 
 
  
 42 
 
 
 
 
 
EVOLUTION OF U.S. POLICIES TOWARDS THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR 
PROGRAM 
 
 This period in this research involves the policies of U.S. administrations prior to 
the Iranian revolution which we will separate from the next period at the end of President 
Carter’s time in office.  The U.S. approach to Iran’s ambition to attain an indigenous 
nuclear program over the past half-century has been like a pendulum swinging from one 
end to the other.  While a brief review of the administrations’ policies to be covered here 
in our will begin with Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, the Nixon 
Administration is widely regarded as responsible, or even to blame, for the current state 
of the Iranian nuclear program.
96
  Because of this perception, the Nixon Administration 
will receive greater attention than most in the period prior to the Islamic Revolution.  
Presidents Ford and Carter will also garner attention in this discussion with the final years 
of Carter’s term as President coinciding with the start of the Iranian Revolution.   
  
The Pre-Nixon Years 
 The roots of nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and Iran can be traced to the 
Eisenhower Administration.  President Eisenhower’s biggest initiative was his “atoms for 
peace” program that loaned uranium to “have not” nations for peaceful use.97  This 
program was facilitated by a presidential initiative designed to amend the 1946 Atomic 
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Energy Act that forbade U.S. cooperation with other countries; his December 8, 1953 
speech to the United Nations not only led to the 1957 Agreement for Cooperation 
Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms mentioned above but also led to the creation of today’s 
IAEA.
98
  Eisenhower stated in this historic speech that one of the missions of this agency 
“would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world,” 
and that, “the United States would be more than willing - it would be proud to take up 
with others principally involved the development of plans whereby such peaceful use of 
atomic energy would be expedited.”99  So while President Eisenhower’s policies and 
statements may not speak directly of Iran’s nuclear program, they are certainly indicative 
of a policy that is more favorable to Iran’s development of nuclear technology, at least for 
peaceful purposes. 
 Presidents  John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson took a much different approach 
towards nuclear policies than the previous Eisenhower administration.  In March 1963, 
during a conversation with the press, Kennedy remarked that he was “haunted” by a fear 
that within the next decade that the U.S. would be in a world where “15 or 20 or 25 
nations possessed nuclear weapons.”100  Kennedy was intent on slowing the spread of 
nuclear weapons, and in August 1963 the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT) was 
signed.
101
  Though the policies of his administration concerning nuclear proliferation 
were not aimed directly at Iran, Kennedy’s policies amounted to reduced cooperation 
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with Iran.  Just prior to Kennedy’s election, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that Iran be 
the site of U.S. nuclear bombs to counter increasing Soviet influence in Cuba.
102
  
However, the Kennedy Administration, when approached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
1961 about the suggestion, immediately opposed and rejected the suggestion.
103
 
Ultimately, while the previous administration favored military cooperation with Iran, 
Kennedy was less inclined to provide the Shah with the military support he requested and 
insisted on internal reforms before transferring money or vital technology to counter the 
perceived Soviet threat.
104
 
 After the assassination of President Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson was sworn into 
office and was immediately met with the challenge of Tehran growing closer to Moscow 
as the Shah was growing tired of being lectured about internal affairs and reforms by 
America when he wanted to purchase military hardware.  Like the Kennedy Presidency, 
Johnson’s tenure provided little, if any, evidence of policies that were directly related to 
the Iranian nuclear program as he was overwhelmingly preoccupied with the Vietnam 
War.  During Johnson’s initial years in office, he followed the policies of President 
Kennedy in resisting the Shah’s requests for increased military sales.   
 However, the period of 1965 to 1967 is regarded as an important timeframe in the 
history of U.S-Iranian relations as the relationship evolved from one which was more 
patron-client oriented to a more equal relationship after the U.S. resumed sophisticated 
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military equipment sales to the Iranians.
105
  Two key components made up the reasoning 
behind this change in President Johnson’s behavior.  First, the U.S. was growing nervous 
over increased cooperation between the Soviets and the Shah as Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson had not sold him with the weapons he desired.  This problem had been brewing 
for years before Johnson finally realized the seriousness.  In September of 1962, more 
than 18 months after President Kennedy had ruled on this subject, the Shah announced 
that Iran would not allow American missiles aimed at the Soviet Union to be stationed on 
his soil.
106
 Later, in January 1967, the Shah would sign a military aid agreement with the 
Soviets for almost $100 million.
107
 
 Second, the U.S. needed to retain the pro-Western orientation of one of its major 
allies in the region.  And with American troops were stuck in a conflict in Vietnam and 
the British instituting its departure from the Middle East region, the U.S. needed to 
ensure that its interests in the Middle East were protected; selling weapons to Iran was a 
means to maintain their pro-Western orientation.
108
  These weapons sales by the U.S. to 
Iran made up approximately 85 percent of Iran’s military imports and included a 
squadron of F-4 Phantom aircraft.
109
  Most importantly during this time period was the 
U.S. support and assistance to set up the Tehran research reactor at the University of 
Tehran with U.S. corporation United Nuclear providing Iran 5.585kg of 93 percent 
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enriched uranium.
110
  It became clear that President Johnson was willing to cooperate 
with Iran in both military sales and nuclear technology to ensure their allegiance 
remained with the U.S. and that Western interests in the region were more secure.  So 
while the Kennedy administration had begun restricting the nuclear relationship with Iran 
during his brief time in office, Johnson reinstituted the modes of cooperation with Iran 
that had been started under the Eisenhower administration.  This increased the level of 
cooperation between Iran and the U.S. and opened the door for the next President, 
Richard Nixon, to embark on an unprecedented level of coordination with their Middle 
East ally in the areas of nuclear power. 
 
The Nixon Presidency 
 In one way, Nixon represented a complete shift from actions of the previous two 
administrations; he nearly halted all criticism of internal Iranian affairs.  Moreover, as 
mentioned by many experts, Nixon opened a new chapter of nuclear cooperation with 
Iran.  He openly encouraged the Shah to pursue an extensive nuclear energy program.
111
  
Within two months of his inauguration in 1969, President Nixon approved the extension 
of the 1957 Iran-U.S. Agreement for Cooperation concerning Civil Uses of Atomic 
Energy; this extension was for another 10 years.
112
  This improved cooperation was 
carried out in the name of the “Nixon Doctrine.”  Initiated in 1969 in the wake of the 
Vietnam War, the doctrine meant that the U.S. would provide both military and economic 
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assistance to its allies in the event they were threatened by external forces, namely the 
Soviet Union.  This doctrine was also designed to give regional states a greater role in 
ensuring the security of their particular parts of the globe. 
 In May 1972, while returning from Moscow, President Nixon and Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger visited Tehran to brief the Shah on what was termed the Twin 
Pillars policy whereby the Shah would not only be given the responsibility for ensuring 
the security and stability of the Persian Gulf region but more importantly to the Shah, the 
ability to “purchase any nonnuclear weapon it wanted from the United States.”113  It was 
the institution of this Twin Pillars Policy during Nixon’s visit in May of 1972 that led to 
the renewed effort of nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and Iran.
 114
   
 The 1973 Yom Kippur War between the Arabs and Israelis presented another 
opportunity for the Iranians.  When the Arab producing countries of OPEC enacted an oil 
embargo against the U.S. for their support of Israel, oil prices rose from $3.01 per barrel 
to $11.65 per barrel, a nearly 300% increase that created a major oil crisis.
115
  However, 
Iran not only chose to disobey the OPEC embargo, but they also ramped up production 
by another 600,000 BPD in order to increase their profits.
116
  And with oil prices reaching 
record highs in the aftermath of, the Shah was fiscally prepared to purchase at will, and 
with the Nixon Administration concerned about the growing U.S. trade deficit due to 
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high oil prices, there were few complaints about the Shah sending those petrodollars back 
to the U.S. for American products which minimized the U.S. trade deficit.
117
    
 In looking more in depth at the nuclear program, the Nixon administration 
provided direct and concrete support to the Iranian program in a multitude of ways, and 
after a Stanford Research Institute study in early 1974 revealed a need for more than 
20,000 MW(e) capacity no later than 1994, the level of cooperation was accelerated, and 
as stated earlier, the Shah then announced his plans to have 23,000 MW(e) of nuclear 
power as fast as was achievable.
118
  Communications from U.S. Ambassador Richard 
Helms to the Shah and his cabinet are a definitive indication of Nixon’s policies, and his 
statements were reflective of the desire for nuclear cooperation.  In a letter dated April 
13, 1974 to Asadollah Alam, the then Iranian Imperial Court Minister, Helms stated how 
nuclear power “is clearly an area in which we might most usefully begin on a specific 
program of cooperation and collaboration” and that “the Chairman of the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) is prepared at an early date to visit Tehran with a team of experts” to 
lay out a plan for this collaboration.
119
  So when Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, the U.S. Chairman of 
the AEC visited Iran in May 1974 at the direction of President Nixon and the State 
Department, he entertained the possibility of establishing both enrichment and 
reprocessing facilities in Iran.   
 It was only a month later in June of 1974 that Nixon approved an agreement for 
the Iranians to purchase two nuclear power plants and the enriched fuel to go with 
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them,
120
 but the eventual formal signing of this agreement would grow the number of 
power plants to eight.  However, the signing would not take place until after President 
Ford took over in the aftermath of the Nixon Watergate scandal.  This provisional 
agreement during the Nixon administration, more than any other, demonstrates that the 
U.S. position at this point in the relationship with Iran was one about cooperation, 
collaboration, and a strategic alliance.  While there was certainly a growing pattern of 
teamwork between the two states, certainly much of the U.S. support to the Iranian 
program was based upon the fact that the Shah was going to be sending large sums of 
petrodollars back to the U.S. to purchase the nuclear equipment for these nuclear 
facilities.
121
 
 It must be noted, though, that in the early 1970s there was no inherent need for 
nuclear power in Iran.  There was no energy crisis or a population boom, but the U.S. and 
other Western states such as France and Germany were encouraging the Shah to pursue 
nuclear energy.  In looking specifically at the U.S. economic situation discussed above, it 
is not difficult to arrive at the conclusion that this encouragement was made because of 
the economic benefits to be had by those selling equipment to Iran – not because of any 
rational need for nuclear power in Iran.  So the U.S. in the 1970s was very willing to 
provide Iran the support it required for a nuclear program, but now, when the economic 
justifications are clear and demonstrate a legitimate need, support from the U.S. is 
nowhere to be had.  In fact, the U.S. now adamantly opposes the program.  So what 
changed?  The Iranian regime, that’s what. 
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The Gerald Ford Presidency 
 President Ford picked up the torch right where President Nixon left it; he 
continued the cooperation with the Shah, but that should come as no surprise considering 
the circumstances of how Ford came to power.  He was of the same party as Nixon, 
Republican, and it was Nixon who nominated him for the Vice Presidency after the 
resignation of the former VP, Spiro Agnew.  However, Ford would have very little time 
to make his mark on the relationship with Iran considering his short tenure in office, just 
about 2 and a half years. 
 Though Ford did have such a short time in office, he wasted little of it in 
advancing the cooperation between the two states in the nuclear arena.  Nixon had left the 
state of U.S. – Iran nuclear cooperation in a very good position to advance, and in 
November of 1974 under the auspice of President Ford, the cooperation between the two 
states continued.  A U.S. – Iran Joint Commission was formed to strengthen ties in 
numerous areas, but a specific focus was placed upon nuclear energy and power 
generation.  The commission also referenced new provisional agreements for a total of 
eight nuclear reactors; and the joint statement issued by this commission also reinforced 
commitments to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
122
  With these statements and 
agreements, there is a great deal of support to the argument that President Ford and his 
team offered the complete nuclear cycle to the Iranians during his tenure as President.
123
 
 The Ford administration also supported a $2.75 billion investment by Iran into a 
United States uranium enrichment facility which was proposed in early 1975.  Ford’s 
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officials agreed that Iran should be entitled to enough fuel to meet their entire inventory 
of nuclear reactors purchased from the U.S.
124
  President Ford and Secretary of State 
Kissinger also supported Iran’s desire to establish a spent fuel reprocessing facility, but 
the Ford administration preferred a multinational facility as opposed to a purely Iranian 
one.
125
   
 President Ford’s policy of cooperation with Iran on the nuclear program was 
extensive and well documented.  Muhammad Sahimi cites multiple National Security 
Memorandums where President Ford expressed his desire for the extensive cooperation 
between the two states.  Ford directed in National Security Memorandum 219, dated 
March 14, 1975, that U.S. officials should make all efforts to find an agreement with Iran 
to facilitate sales of nuclear equipment as well as Iranian investment in U.S. facilities.
126
  
Several other memorandums over the following months from President Ford as well as 
Secretary of State Kissinger would continue to convey this American policy of 
cooperation with Iran.  These memorandums also reiterated the support for the 
establishment of a spent fuel reprocessing facility in Iran; however, as mentioned earlier, 
President Ford continued to insist that the facility be either binational with the U.S. or 
multinational.
127
  One interesting point that should be made about the Ford administration 
and its extensive cooperation is the fact that two of the most senior officials in this 
administration, then White House Chief of Staff Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense 
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Donald Rumsfeld, would later hold completely opposite views on the American policy 
towards the Iranian nuclear program under President George W. Bush’s administration.   
 President Ford’s cooperative policies towards Iran were evidenced in both word 
and deed; in a May 15, 1975 meeting with the Shah, he spoke of the importance in 
expanding and “deepening” ties with Iran as non-oil trade (much of it nuclear related) 
was to grow to “over $20 billion by 1980.”128  Ford’s support of the cooperative policies 
with Iran extended all the way to the end of his Presidency, and in a Presidential debate 
with then Governor Jimmy Carter, he reinforced his support for cooperation with Iran.  
There he stated that, “it’s my strong feeling that we ought to sell arms to Iran for its own 
national security, and as an ally, a strong ally of the United States.”129  Instances such as 
these were littered through the Ford Presidency and lend strong support to the notion that 
the U.S. policy at the time was one of cooperation and collaboration in the arena of 
nuclear technology. 
 It is clear by the support given by both the Nixon and Ford administrations that 
there was a policy of cooperation from the Americans directed towards the Iranian 
nuclear program.  Regardless of whether or not it was being done to decrease Soviet 
influence in the region, to recoup funds to minimize the growing U.S. trade deficit with 
the rise in oil prices, or a combination of these two reasons, it is apparent that cooperation 
was the name of the game.  During these two administrations, all types of support was 
provided, and considering the sensitive nature of nuclear technology at the time, there is 
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little doubting that the highest levels of these administrations had a heavy hand in all 
dealings from the sales of equipment, facilities, and fuel to the approval of training for 
Iranian nuclear scientists in the U.S.  Though debatable, one nuclear expert, Muhammad 
Sahimi, even goes so far as to argue that neither Nixon nor Ford would have “minded if 
the Shah developed the bomb because the Shah was a close ally of the United States” and 
that “it would have been a big deterrent against the USSR.”130  While there is no overt 
evidence supporting this statement, such a significant amount of U.S. assistance to the 
Shah and his nuclear ambitions would permit a reasonable person to at least entertain 
such a notion especially considering the Shah’s public references to wanting to build an 
atomic bomb.
131
 
 
The Jimmy Carter Presidency 
 The election of Jimmy Carter to the Presidency continued the policy of 
cooperation with Iran on the nuclear program.  His presidency, though, represents a 
transition period for the relations between Iran and the U.S. because of the coming 
Islamic Revolution.  Though the U.S. failed to see the revolution coming, the Shah did 
put some of his nuclear plans on the shelf as he dealt with internal turmoil.  And when the 
revolution began and ultimately culminated with the Islamic hardliners in power, the 
Khomeini slogan of “Neither East, nor West, only the Islamic Republic” would take the 
place of the cooperation between the two states. 
 While the revolution did represent the turning point in the cooperative policies 
between the U.S. and Iran, up until that point, Carter continued expanding nuclear 
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cooperation at a rapid pace.  Within the first few months of his inauguration, in April of 
1977 President Carter’s administration signed off on a new agreement with the Shah to 
“exchange nuclear technology and cooperate in nuclear safety.”132  The year 1977 would 
witness additional routine talks between the two governments on nuclear cooperation.   
 The following year, after President Carter had a complete year since his 
inauguration in the White House, cooperation with Iran would accelerate. On January 1
st
, 
1978, President Carter would make a historic New Year’s visit to Tehran where another 
bilateral agreement was reached; this one announced that Iran would have “most favored 
nation status for reprocessing spent nuclear fuels,” and that Iran was also to buy 6-8 light-
water nuclear reactors.”133  Within another seven months on July 10, 1978, the draft of 
this agreement, known as the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement, was signed in 
Tehran.  Designed to “facilitate cooperation…as well as to govern the export and transfer 
of equipment and material to Iran,” it was the first bilateral agreement of its kind 
submitted to the U.S. Congress.
134
   
 However, with Iran in political turmoil and on the brink of revolution in 1978, by 
the time the document reached President Carter’s desk in October 1978, the Shah had 
placed his nuclear cooperation with the U.S. on hold.
135
  The change in policies towards 
the Iranian nuclear program could not necessarily be characterized as a decision which 
was implemented by the Carter Administration.  The Shah’s decisions to postpone 
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progression of the Iranian nuclear program were direct results of the ongoing internal 
strife in Iran.   
 This agreement wasn’t the only activity ongoing between the U.S. and Iran in 
1978 despite the internal problems within Iran.  Department of Energy (DoE) Secretary 
James Schlesinger was heavily involved in the agreement mentioned above as well as the 
approval of the transfer of equipment for an emerging technology known as laser 
enrichment.
136
  One of these transfers was conducted by a private citizen, Jeffery 
Eerkens, who ultimately received approval from the DoE to sell laser enrichment 
technology to Iran, and they were shipped in October of 1978; however the lasers are 
reported to have failed at their intended purpose of enriching uranium.
137
 
 After the Shah’s fall from power in Iran, contracts with not only the U.S. but also 
France and Germany for nuclear projects were cancelled;  Ayatollah Khomeini and the 
other Islamic hardliners fought against the modernization efforts of the Shah.  
Khomeini’s anti-modernization policies meant that the nuclear program would suffer 
extensively, and it translated to the spending towards modernizing the military and 
civilian infrastructures being turned off.  Additionally, the ensuing Cultural Revolution in 
1980 that led to the flight of many western educated Iranians also meant that many of the 
highly trained nuclear scientists were allowed to leave the country.
138
  The Carter 
administration’s, and previous ones, cooperative policies towards the Iranian nuclear 
program in earlier years was now irrelevant; Khomeini and his fellow clerics intended to 
destroy everything that had been part of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran bringing 
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virtually every project to a standstill. 
139
  When Khomeini finally gave the approval for 
the resumption of the nuclear facilities, it was too late to obtain assistance from the West.  
Angered over the hostage crisis and nervous over the direction of the Iranian clerical 
leadership, the U.S. began its pattern of pressuring states not to provide assistance to Iran, 
and Germany and France were the first to refuse to resume work on the facilities at 
Bushehr, Darkhovin, and Esfahan. 
 The Carter administration would be the last U.S. administration to cooperate with 
the Iranians in the arena of nuclear technology.  “The U.S. not only stopped cooperating 
with Iran in the nuclear field, but also pursued a policy of denial by putting pressure on 
other countries not to transfer nuclear technology to Iran.
140
 Additionally, the ensuing 
hostage crisis that was to be resolved upon President Carter leaving office would also 
permanently scar present and future U.S. politicians; U.S. leaders would subsequently 
reject diplomatic offers from Iran over the nuclear issue as they were “still holding on to 
the hostage crisis.”141  American support for Iran’s nuclear program was dead; a new 
policy was needed to cope with the regime of Khomeini.   
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U.S. POLICIES TOWARDS REVOLUTIONARY IRAN 
 Our next period comes as the Islamic Revolution has swept Iran and President 
Reagan took office in January 1979.  As for the Islamic Revolution and overthrow of the 
Shah, it was the turning point when the United States changed their policies towards the 
Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear technology.  As it has been more than thirty years since 
this event, this will require covering each administration since.  The administrations of 
Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, Bush II, and Obama, were confronted with a completely 
different regime in Iran than previous presidents; these Presidents would gradually usher 
in an unprecedented policy of denial of nuclear technology that would force the Iranian 
nuclear program to find other means to meet their nuclear ambitions.   
 Each of these administrations would pursue their own specific strategies to cope 
with the Iranian nuclear problem, but the underlying policy of denial was one that grew 
from administration to administration.  There wasn’t a consistent policy towards Iran in 
the first years after the revolution; the U.S. was still struggling with how to handle the 
new regime as well as how to craft a policy that fit with the national security of the 
United States.  It would take over a decade, until the Clinton administration, for a clearer 
policy vision to be formulated towards the Iranians.  The following sections will detail 
these policies and specific strategies employed by each administration. 
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The Reagan Years 
 When it comes to President Reagan and Iran, on the surface, one might have the 
impression that Reagan was cooperative with Iran due to the Iran-contra affair.  This 
covert operation ran by now retired Colonel Oliver North sent arms, munitions, and spare 
parts to the Iranians to use in their war against Iraq.  The funds that Iran sent to the U.S. 
via Israel were used to support the Contra rebels in Nicaragua in their fight against the 
leftist elements, the Sandinistas, but more importantly for Reagan and the U.S., they were 
sent to Iran in exchange for the release of seven American hostages being held by 
Lebanese Hezbollah.
142
  In addition to the harm done by the holding of hostages at the 
American embassy in Tehran, the hostage taking by pro-Iranian Hezbollah and the Iran-
Contra scandal furthered the perception in the U.S. that Iran was a “deceptive and hostile 
power.”143   
 While Pollack argued that the weapons were in exchange for these hostages, Gary 
Sick, an Iran expert on the National Security Council during the Carter Presidency, 
alleges something more sinister transpired between Reagan and the Iranian leaders.  Sick, 
in his book October Surprise and also in a New York Times article from April 15, 1991, 
accused presidential candidate Ronald Reagan’s campaign team of meeting “secretly with 
Iranian officials to delay the release of the American hostages until after the U.S. 
election” which would be “rewarded with….arms from Israel.”144  These are strong 
allegations of which no definitive proof was offered, but the fact that American hostages 
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were released soon after the inauguration of President Reagan only fuels the conspiracy 
theory. 
 What is important, though about the Iran-Contra affair is that the initial intent of 
the exchange was not intended as such.  President Reagan said in a national address on 
November 13, 1986 that, “My purpose was to convince Tehran that our negotiators were 
acting with my authority, to send a signal that the United States was prepared to replace 
the animosity between us with a new relationship.”145  And in a later speech to the nation 
on March 4, 1987, he stated that, “I undertook the original Iran initiative in order to 
develop relations with those who might assume leadership in a post-Khomeini 
government.”146  Pollack argues that during the Reagan administration the U.S. probably 
did not have a clear policy towards Iran or a strategy towards achieving concrete goals.  
But while the Reagan administration was sending mixed messages and sought to 
cooperate with Iran in order to secure the release of the hostages and set the stage for 
improved diplomatic relations in the future, there was no cooperation in sight 
surrounding the nuclear program.  There is definitive evidence to show that. 
 The Reagan administration took concrete steps to deny Iran’s attempts to 
reassemble their nuclear program just as Khomeini and “the clerics realized that they had 
killed the goose which laid the golden egg” by halting the nuclear program.147  The 
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Reagan administration, on September 9, 1982, began tightening the noose around the 
Iranian nuclear program by putting Iran on a list of countries to which the export of 
nuclear technology was to be banned.
148
  This pressure is believed to have resulted in the 
German company Kraftwerk Union refusing to cooperate with Iran in completing the 
Bushehr reactor deal.
149
  However, it is more likely that the Iraqi strikes on the Bushehr 
reactor were more responsible for the Germans’ refusals to work on a reactor that was the 
target of military strikes, but the U.S. role in these strikes must be discussed. 
 Nothing is more indicative of Reagan’s hostility towards Iran than the support 
given to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War.  While there is certainly not a smoking gun 
indicating that the Reagan administration provided support to these Iraqi strikes on the 
Bushehr nuclear reactor from 1984 to 1988, the indicators are undeniable.  Reagan’s 
Special Envoy to the Middle East, Donald Rumsfeld, visited Baghdad on multiple 
occasions before and after these strikes; additionally, the U.S. military support to Iraq in 
the war against Iran cannot be ignored.
150
  Considering the extensive support to the Iraqis 
against Iran and Rumsfeld’s visits, it is possible that the Reagan administration 
encouraged the Iraqi strikes on the Bushehr reactor especially since the legislation 
controlling export of nuclear technology to Iran was only completed the previous year, 
1982.   
 Rumsfeld first visited Baghdad and Saddam Hussein on December 20, 1983 
where he discussed “regional issues of mutual interest” and “affirmed the Reagan 
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administration’s willingness to do more regarding the Iran-Iraq War.” 151 Again around 
March 25, 1984,
152
 just a day after the first Iraqi strike on the Bushehr reactor on March 
24
th
,
153
 Rumsfeld would visit Baghdad again.  Certainly the fact that Rumsfeld would 
visit almost immediately after the Iraqis had conducted such a high profile airstrike 
against Iran’s nuclear facilities cannot be a coincidence.  As we now know that the U.S. 
provided extensive intelligence support to the Iraqis during the war, I argue that it is 
likely that Rumsfeld may have provided Iraq with a battle damage assessment (BDA) of 
the strike.  This BDA would have permitted the Iraqis to make more knowledgeable 
decisions about what types of munitions to utilize and which facilities to strike.  By the 
end of the war, the Iraqis had struck the Bushehr nuclear plant a total of eight times with 
the last strike being on July 19, 1988. 
 While the Reagan administration provided various types of support to the Iraqis 
during the Iran-Iraq war, throughout his two terms as President he consistently 
reinstituted the export controls mentioned above from 1982.  President Reagan’s message 
to Congress explaining Executive Order 12470 issued on March 30, 1984, again just days 
after the Iraqi strike of the Bushehr reactor, specifically mentioned the Middle East, 
though not Iran, as a target of this Executive Order.
154
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 President Reagan’s policies were fairly consistent on Iran, and Pollack’s view that 
the Reagan administration had no clear policy on Iran is difficult to substantiate.  Reagan 
supported Iraq against Iran in the early years of the Iran-Iraq War, though the weapons he 
would provide to Iran via Israel later would mitigate this.  But other U.S. government 
actions toward Iran during Reagan’s tenure also conveyed an anti-Iran message; 
Operations Earnest Will and Praying Mantis were two U.S. military operations decidedly 
against Iran in an attempt to preserve the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz by anti-
mine operations and reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers.  Throughout his term, he did 
maintain Iran on the export controls list to prevent the transfer of sensitive and dual use 
technology which could further their nuclear program.  While this political pressure 
proved effective, it is likely that many states were also leery of dealing with the new 
regime of Iran in the aftermath of the revolution. 
 But in defense of Pollack’s argument, Reagan allowed other trade with Iran to 
boom; U.S. oil companies, by the end of Reagan’s 2nd term, were the largest buyers of 
Iranian oil, over 500,000 BPD.
155
  Reagan also upheld the Algiers Declaration which 
regulated the arbitration of lawsuits back and forth between the U.S. and Iran in the 
aftermath of the hostage crisis.  So Reagan’s overall policy to Iran may have been termed 
as a pragmatic one, but as this research is intended to study the nuclear program, we do 
find evidence of the origins of the policy of denial towards the Iranian nuclear program.  
President Reagan’s pragmatic policies and strategies towards Iran would leave his 
successor, President George H.W. Bush, to further solidify U.S. policy towards Iran.
156
 
 
                                                             
155 Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S. and the Twisted Path to Confrontation, p. 179. 
 
156 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, p. 235. 
 63 
 
Bush I and Iranian Policy 
 The first President Bush began his tenure as the 41
st
 U.S. President by extending 
an olive branch to the Iranian regime in his January 20, 1989 inaugural address.  It was in 
this speech that he made a reference to U.S. hostages being held by Iranian sponsored 
Lebanese terrorists when he said that “there are today Americans who are being held in 
foreign lands,” and that “assistance can be shown here and will be long remembered. 
Good will begets good will.”157  This act of good faith by President Bush opened the door 
for a potential improvement in relations with Iran, and it did not go unnoticed in Iran.  
Two prominent Iranian leaders, Speaker and soon to be President Rafsanjani and 
Supreme Court Justice Ardabili, both came out with what were pro-western statements 
and conciliatory remarks about the Iran-Iraq War and the hostage crisis, but Ayatollah 
Khomeini would put a stop to the rapprochement almost one month later when he issued 
the infamous Salman Rushdie fatwa calling for the death of this anti-Islam author.
158
 
 Unfortunately for Iran, the Bush administration did not put the construction of 
policies towards Iran at the forefront of its initiatives.  Other world events took center 
stage during Bush’s time as President and competed to reduce his administration’s 
attention towards Iran and their advancing nuclear program.  The fall of the Berlin Wall, 
Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War, the crumbling of the Soviet 
Union, and the Madrid Peace Process all encumbered the Bush administration and left 
him little patience to deal with a fractured Iranian leadership.  Additionally, the facts that 
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the remaining hostages in Lebanon that Bush referenced in his inaugural address were not 
being freed, the January 31, 1989 execution of Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins, a 
hostage since 1988, and the domestic killings of regime opponents turned the Bush 
administration against improved relations with Iran.
159
 
 A more careful look at the Iranian nuclear program during the first Bush 
administration reveals an extraordinary level of coordination and assistance from a 
multitude of states.  Iran sought and received materials, instruction, and other support 
from Argentina, China, Spain, West Germany, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union.
160
  The 
support in 1989 and 1990 consisted of work on the Bushehr plant, signings of new 
agreements for nuclear cooperation, repair to the nuclear reactor at Tehran University, 
and construction on a plutonium reactor.
161
  With all of the support flowing into the 
Iranian nuclear program being reported in the open press, it is unthinkable that the Bush 
administration could be considered unaware of the Iranian nuclear program’s progress.  
There are entire departments in the multiple intelligence agencies (CIA, DIA, and NSA) 
devoted to such areas; to believe that the Iranian nuclear program was progressing in 
secret is to deny the tremendous amount of information available at the time.   
 One indication of the direction of President George H.W. Bush’s formulation of 
an Iran policy includes the transfer of dual use technology to Iran between 1990 and 
1991.  President Reagan, as discussed above, had restricted the export of sensitive 
technology to Iran in his 1982 ban, but over the course of about 13 months, the U.S. 
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Department of Commerce permitted the transfer of high-tech equipment to Iran.  When 
reviewed by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a Washington D.C. based 
group, it was claimed that the $59 million in materials could be used for Iran’s nuclear 
program as well as ballistic missile development.
162
   The July 1990 removal of export 
controls on dual use technology to Eastern Europe after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union also opened the door for Iran to obtain important materials for their nuclear 
program; at this point, U.S. State Department officials were aware that Iran was 
researching uranium enrichment techniques.
163
 
 While the U.S. opened the door for the indirect transfer of U.S. technology to 
Iran, they made few efforts to halt nuclear cooperation between Iran and some of the 
states mentioned above.  The Bush administration did pressure Spain to halt work on the 
Bushehr reactor in Iran in 1990,
164
 but other efforts to stymie the Iranian nuclear program 
were not met with such success.  In March of 1992, India agreed to sell a 10MW research 
reactor to Iran despite U.S. pressure.
165
  Additionally, while Mustafa Kibaroglu rightfully 
emphasizes Bush administration protests to the Chinese sale of both 20MW and 
330MW(e) reactors to Iran in September of 1992,
166
 his research disregards the fact that 
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Chinese officials stated on November 25
th
 of that same year that they would continue 
their cooperation with Iran to build nuclear power plants for peaceful purposes.
167
   
 Comments by Brent Scowcroft, Bush’s national security advisor, reveal that Bush 
was interested in improving relations with Iran; he stated that Bush’s officials “had a 
positive view toward expanding the relationship with Iran.” 168  So Bush charged 
Scowcroft and Bruce Reidel, his director of Persian affairs with finding options to resolve 
the diplomatic stalemate.  Later, though, Reidel, would comment that he was “told to put 
the options paper on hold” after the Rushdie affair and numerous political assassinations 
carried out by Iranian intelligence officers throughout Europe.
169
 
 The transfers of technology mentioned above, combined with the increasing 
cooperation towards the construction of the Iranian nuclear complex by many parties 
despite pressure from the Bush administration, demonstrated a policy that could be 
characterized as dismissive towards Iranian nuclear ambitions.  Perhaps the Bush 
administration was too caught up in the other events discussed earlier to give the Iranian 
nuclear program much serious thought.  The Bush 41 administration was simply unable 
to delay the progress of the Iranian nuclear program.  The 1980s and 1990s were the 
height of the U.S. might in the world; the U.S. was standing as the lone remaining 
military and economic superpower in the world after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union.  The Bush administration could not exert enough pressure to halt the Iranian 
nuclear program.  I argue that the Bush administration simply was uncertain in how to 
proceed in its relations with Iran, and the administration’s ineffectiveness supports that 
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assessment.  While Bush 41 could not conceive of an effective policy or strategy towards 
Iran, the successive Clinton administration would leave little to doubt as to their policies. 
 
The President William Jefferson Clinton Era 
 The administration of President Clinton would be the first administration to set 
out on developing a more clear and consistent policy towards Iran.  While the policy 
began with both Iran and Iraq in mind, the policy was definitively more understandable 
than those of Reagan and George H.W. Bush.  Clinton’s policy was termed as “dual 
containment,” directed at isolating both Iran and Iraq via political, economic, and military 
methods; two Clinton staffers, Martin Indyk, the Middle East Officer on the National 
Security Council, and Anthony Lake, a Special Assistant for National Security, are 
credited with conceiving and developing the policy.
170
  This overarching policy towards 
Iran would prove to be the driving force behind the Clinton administration’s strategy 
aimed at the Iranian nuclear program. 
 One particular article from 1994 in Foreign Affairs does an exceptional job of 
laying out the policy of dual containment as well as the strategies to be employed against 
the nuclear program.  There, Anthony Lake explains that this policy’s purpose was to 
“counter the hostility of both Baghdad and Tehran” but with “tailored approaches.”171  
This detailed description on Clinton’s approach towards Iran also states that “Iran is 
actively engaged in clandestine efforts to acquire nuclear and other unconventional 
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weapons” and that because Iran is in such an early stage of nuclear development that the 
Clinton administration “has an opportunity now to prevent Iran from becoming in five 
years what Iraq was five years ago.”172  The strategy by which the Clinton administration 
coordinated with other governments to halt Iran’s acquisition of technology and materials 
for their nuclear program was absolutely a key piece of the Clinton strategy against 
Iran.
173
  This Clinton staffer notes that it is the administration’s goal to convey a 
consistent message to the Iranians
174
 – something that was partially lacking over the 
previous two administrations, and the Clinton Presidency would provide the clearest 
policy towards Iran and its nuclear program since the Shah, though it would be quite the 
opposite of that period.  It should be noted, though, that their policy was not designed to 
rule out productive dialogue with the Iranians, the Clinton administration strongly argued 
that pressure was necessary to change Iranian behaviors.
175
 
 The Clinton administration made extensive efforts to uphold their policy of dual 
containment mentioned above.  Their efforts took little time to manifest in 1993 as 
attempts to convince friendly states to halt cooperation with the Iranian nuclear program 
began.  In June of 1993, the U.S. pressured Japan for providing a $360 million loan to 
Iran, and then applied pressure on European states to research the status of the Iranian 
nuclear program.
176
  Clinton’s first Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, during 
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discussions with the Europeans commented that “Iran must understand that it cannot have 
normal commercial relations on the one hand while trying to develop weapons of mass 
destruction on the other,” and it was during this visit that the European foreign ministers 
agreed to a joint study for economic sanctions against Iran because of their supposed 
clandestine nuclear program.
177
 
 Later that year in September of 1993, the United States would make another 
major proposal to tighten Iran’s ability to acquire nuclear technology.  During a G-7 
summit, Clinton officials requested that export restrictions be eased and a monitoring 
system directed at dual-use technology be instituted.  However, the U.S. officials would 
only agree to a loosening of restrictions provided that “former socialist states” won’t 
export to a number of specific states that include Iran.
178
  This type of pressure from the 
Clinton administration would be constant on the Iranian nuclear program over the coming 
years. 
 In his second year in office, on November 14, 1994, President Clinton rescinded 
Bush’s Executive Order (EO) 12735 (Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation) 
and signed Executive Order 12938 (Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction).  
Certainly meant to encompass nuclear technology which the previous executive order had 
failed to include, this order “prohibits the export of any services” that “would assist a 
foreign country in acquiring the capability to develop, produce, stockpile, deliver, or use 
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weapons of mass destruction.”179  Though the Executive Order did not cite Iran in name, 
considering the actions already undertaken by the administration and those to come in the 
near future, it is highly unlikely that the signing of this document was unrelated to his 
policy of dual containment against both Iraq and Iran. 
 Less than a year after signing EO 12938, President Clinton signed Executive 
Orders 12957 (Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the Development of 
Iranian Petroleum Resources) and 12959 (Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect 
to Iran) on March 15 and May 6, 1995 respectively; these EOs represented the first steps 
to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) which is today simply known as the Iran 
Sanctions Act.
180
  While the final legislation evolved into one including Libya, the first 
orders signed by President Clinton was specifically directed at Iran alone.  They were the 
first executive orders of their kind that were drafted with Iran specifically in the 
crosshairs; previous administrations had not been so precise as to single out Iran for an 
executive order.  These two orders were designed to “deprive Iran of the ability to acquire 
weapons of mass destruction and to fund terrorist groups by hindering its ability to 
modernize its key petroleum sector,” and the economic analysis above explained why the 
maintenance of their petroleum sector is so important.
181
   
 Up until the signing of ILSA, one inalienable fact crippled the Clinton 
administration’s efforts to enforce existing sanctions against other states: by 1995, the 
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U.S had grown to be Iran’s third largest trading partner and the largest purchaser of oil.182 
American efforts to pressure Japan and Europe into agreeing that “U.S. economic 
isolation or containment of Iran was a good idea was offset by the reality that the U.S. 
was Iran’s premier trading partner.”183  One specific example highlights the hypocrisy of 
U.S. sanctions up until this point.  In 1995, U.S. oil company Conoco announced that 
they were signing a $1 billion contract with Iran in order to develop the Sirri gas field, 
and under U.S. law it was completely legal at the time.
184
  Conoco had made no secret in 
its dealings while attempting to secure the contract over France’s Total; State Department 
officials had been made aware of its efforts.
185
   Iran and specifically President Rafsanjani 
must have been hopeful that the deal would help to thaw out the relations with the U.S.  
However the outrage over the deal was unrelenting thus forcing Conoco’s parent 
company, Dupont, to cancel the contract, and a race began between the Republican-led 
Congress and President Clinton to see who could appear more bullish with Iran the 
fastest.  The Conoco affair thus became the precursor to a more stringent policy of 
containment and isolation by the Clinton administration and ended the extensive trade 
relations between the two states. 
 The signing of the executive orders that followed the Conoco affair represented 
Clinton’s first steps towards stronger sanctions aimed at Iran.  Later that year, when Iran 
began opening their energy sector to foreign investment, Congress, “with input from the 
                                                             
182 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, p. 271. 
 
183 Kemp, Geoffrey. “U.S.-Iranian Strategic Cooperations since 1979.” In Checking Iran’s Nuclear 
Ambitions, edited by Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, 106. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 
College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2004. 
 
184 Sick, “Rethinking Dual Containment,“ p. 9. 
 
185 Ibid. 
 
 72 
 
Clinton administration, developed legislation to sanction such investment.”186  The 
legislation represented even more severe sanctions towards Iran than Clinton initially 
intended as one bill, the Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act passed on December 18, 1995, 
actually placed sanctions on foreign companies investing in Iran’s energy sector, not just 
American.
187
  Regardless of the more stringent terminology and the inclusion of Libya by 
an amendment to the original bill, President Clinton would sign the bill into law as the 
ILSA on August 5, 1996.  The bill carried a five year term, but stated that Iran could 
eliminate sanctions if they cease efforts to develop WMD.
188
 
 The ILSA certainly painted a crystal clear message to the Iranian leadership, but 
the implementation of ILSA by the Clinton administration would prove to be different.  
Unfortunately, the sanctions against foreign states were viewed as “extraterritorial 
applications of U.S. law” and aggravated the European Union specifically.189  The 
provisions in the ILSA which permitted the President to waive sanctions on the basis of 
national security interests were used by President Clinton in both 1997 and 1998, and this 
waiver permitted the French firm Total SA as well as their Russian and Malaysian 
partners to invest $2 billion in the Iranian energy sector without the threat of U.S. 
sanctions.
190
  While on the surface this may appear to be an inconsistent application of 
the dual containment policy, the waivers which were granted to the EU represented a 
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quid pro quo as the EU agreed to cooperate with the U.S. in efforts aimed at non-
proliferation.
191
  However, the contracts that Iran awarded for development which were 
not sanctioned by the U.S. provided sufficient enough investment to maintain their oil 
production at approximately 4 million BPD, and instead of tightening the sanctions as the 
Clinton administration could have, they relaxed them out of “national security interests.”  
In private, administration officials conceded that the policy of dual containment was a 
“defensive strategy” that was “highly unlikely” to alter Iranian behavior.192  Ultimately, 
the policy of dual containment lacked “strategic viability” and carried “a high financial 
and diplomatic cost,” and this policy drove “Iran and Russia together and the United 
States and its Group of Seven allies apart.”193   
 The 1997 election of President Khatami in Iran represented an opening for a 
change in the Clinton administration’s actions towards Iran.  In a CNN interview with 
Christiane Amanpour on January 7, 1998, Khatami made his references to a “dialogue of 
civilizations” and the exchange of “professors, writers, scholars, artists, journalists, and 
tourists” to break down the “bulky wall of mistrust” between Iran and the U.S.194  The 
Clinton administration, as would President Khatami, would take positive steps in an 
attempt to improve relations, and the previous policy of dual containment would be 
discarded in favor of a new policy of engagement with Iran.    
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With the election of Khatami, Clinton’s new engagement policy would slightly 
ease the sanctions against Iran by permitting U.S. exports of items such as food and 
medical supplies and the import of Iranian goods such as carpets and caviar to the U.S.
195
  
The fact that Clinton did not pressure France, Russia, or Malaysia over the $2 billion 
investment in Iran’s energy sector mentioned earlier is further evidence that Clinton was 
not eager to sanction Iran.  Clinton would also direct State Department officials to attend 
conferences where Iranian officials were expected to encourage dialogue on a variety of 
issues.  The gestures of goodwill from the Clinton administration went as high as 
Secretary of State Albright and the President himself.   
In 1998, Madeleine Albright spoke at the Asia Society calling for a “road map to 
better relations,” and prior to a World Cup game between the U.S. and Iran, President 
Clinton stated, “as we cheer today’s game between American and Iranian athletes, I hope 
it can be another step towards ending the strains between our nations.”196  In 1999, 
Clinton even sent a handwritten letter to President Khatami requesting assistance in 
solving the Khobar Towers bombing; it was delivered by Martin Indyk to be carried to 
the Iranian President by Omani Foreign Minister Yousef Bin Alawi.
197
  Unfortunately the 
letter was met with no response from the Iranian President, who without visible 
concessions from the U.S., could not afford to be seen as supporting the Great Satan.  
However, despite the positive overtures, the Clinton administration continued to 
coordinate with allies to prevent transfers of sensitive technology.    
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 Other than the sanctions and the commitment to convince other states to work 
with the U.S. on nonproliferation to Iran, the Clinton administration’s policies of dual 
containment and engagement employed very few effective strategies.  One of these 
strategies was the $18 million CIA covert action program; this program publicly 
announced the U.S. intentions to change Tehran’s behavior.198  Unfortunately for Clinton, 
it did not achieve the desired result of moderating Iranian behavior, and tensions with 
Iran grew more confrontational in nature.
199
  Military threats against Iran for their 
confrontational and aggressive actions, such as the widely held belief by experts such as 
Ray Takeyh and Kenneth Pollack that Iran sponsored the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing 
in Saudi Arabia,
200
 were nonexistent.   
 In reality, there was no substance or teeth to the Clinton administration’s efforts to 
stem the tide of Iranian nuclear development, and it showed.  A review of the 1995-2000 
period just prior to and after the implementation of ILSA on the Nuclear Threat Initiative 
website reveals reporting of extensive support to the Iranian nuclear program from states 
including Russia, China, South Africa, Austria, and the Ukraine.
201
  In January of 1995, 
Russia signed an $800 million contract with Iran to complete the construction of the 
Bushehr NPP with the first unit being completed within four years, and just a month later 
China would go on record defending their right to sell peaceful nuclear technology to Iran 
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in accordance with IAEA regulations.
202
  Both of these deals were subjected to intense 
pressures from the Clinton administration, but Russia and China continually insisted that 
the agreements were in accordance with the IAEA and international law so they would 
proceed.   
 However, in January of 1996, China announced their plan to sell two reactors to 
Iran was cancelled, but that they would continue nuclear cooperation with Iran to include 
assistance in mining for uranium in Yazd.
203
  Additionally, in 1996, Russia would 
continue their support as their contract on the Bushehr construction went into effect 
giving them 55 months to complete the job.
204
  Later in 1996, China would again assert 
its intentions to sell a UF6 plant to Iran over U.S. objections, but again Clinton would 
pressure China to halt the deal.
205
  
 U.S. pressure on China appeared to be working, possibly because of its desire for 
acceptance into the World Trade Organization and more importantly for the signing of 
the 1985 bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation that would allow peaceful 
nuclear technology to be shipped to China.
206
  However, pressure was having no impact 
on Russian support to the Iranian nuclear program.  Russia would support Iran through its 
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continued construction of the Bushehr plant along with signing additional agreements for 
safety and uranium mining in the summer of 1997.
207
   
 The year 1997 would see companies from more states step up to support the 
Iranian nuclear program possibly due to the election of a more moderate President 
Khatami.  For example, an Austrian company provided material support in the form of a 
cyclotron which is used to enrich uranium at Iran’s nuclear research center in Karaj in 
violation of EU sanctions of Iran.
208
  After an August 1997 IAEA inspection in Iran 
found no evidence of secret nuclear activity at two nuclear reactors in Iran,
 209
 the years 
1998 to 2000 under the Clinton administration would see additional advancements in the 
Iranian program.  During this time period, Russia would make plans to build a research 
reactor for Iran, and Iran would produce more purified plutonium that had been removed 
from the  Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC).
210
  Iran would begin conducting 
centrifuge tests at the Kalaye Electric Company and enrich U235 to 1.2%, and the 
designs for uranium conversion facility in Esfahan.
211
   
 So it was during the Clinton administration that Iran began to really progress its 
nuclear program. Russia was building facilities, agreements were being signed with 
Russia and China, and scientists were being trained in both Russia and China.  While all 
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of these examples of progress and support to their nuclear program are small individually, 
collectively, I argue, they were enormous in giving Iran something to build upon. 
 Dual containment failed in its objectives because the Clinton administration did 
not have the support of the Europeans and Japan who disagreed with the U.S. in the case 
of Iran primarily because of the lack of hard evidence on nuclear weapons.
212
  And the 
policy of engagement pursued during the second Clinton term achieved little either in 
terms of the Iranian nuclear program or in overall diplomatic relations.  While Clinton 
sought containment initially, the fact that U.S. trade with Iran was soaring sent the wrong 
message, and when Iran showed some positive behavior towards  the U.S. by offering the 
lucrative Conoco deal to an American company, Iran was subjected to increased 
sanctions rather than rewarded.  Then after passing these sanctions, Clinton attempted to 
reconcile with an Iran as he pressured other states to not deal with Iran economically or in 
the nuclear field.  When Iran understandably was unresponsive to the overtures by the 
Clinton team, Clinton responded with the CIA program in an effort to force them to 
change their behavior.  The inconsistency in Clinton’s partially effective policies and 
strategies only put Iran on the fast track to seeking entry into the nuclear club.   
  Just months after Clinton left office Iranian Supreme Leader Khamene’i 
squashed talk of reconciliation with the U.S. when he threatened Majles officials who 
called for a normalization of relations with the United States.
213
  Shortly after this 
October 31, 2001 statement by the Iranian Supreme Leader, President George W. Bush 
would completely alter relations between Iran and the United States for the better part of 
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the next decade.  There would be little mistaking the younger President Bush’s policy 
with those of his predecessor, President Clinton. 
 
President George W. Bush and the Axis of Evil 
 The administration of George W. Bush would bring about another shift in policy 
towards Iran.  However,  policy in Bush’s first term was much less clear than the policies 
of his predecessor.  Early on, Bush 43 strained to devise a “coherent strategy toward Iran, 
and seemed to lurch between calling for regime change and demanding that Iran assist the 
U.S. in its military actions” in Afghanistan.214  With this difficulty in resolving the path 
forward, the policy tilted towards containment, isolation, and denial of nuclear 
technology.  There was a distinct stalemate in the Bush cabinet over the direction of Iran 
policy, but because the Clinton administration was rebuffed by Iran in earlier efforts to 
restart relations, the Bush policy was galvanized and prevented any major initiative 
towards building relations with Iran.  Throughout Bush’s terms in office, the President 
would utilize a variety of strategies to support his policies; these would include sanctions, 
political rhetoric and pressure, military threats, support to topple the Iranian regime, and 
very little dialogue.  He often referred to it by saying that “all options are on the table.” 
 To understand how torn the Bush administration was over Iranian policy, we must 
look at the ILSA, which came up for renewal in August of 2001.  As mentioned above, 
ILSA traditionally ran for five years before requiring a renewal.  With the differing 
opinions in the White House, a position was taken to only extend ILSA for two years as 
opposed to five, but in the end Congress overrode Bush and voted for another five 
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years.
215
   Additionally, during 2001 the Bush administration would continue the Clinton 
administration’s efforts to simply convince other states not to cooperate with Iran 
economically or in the development of their nuclear program.  The Bush administration 
also continued the six plus two talks on Afghanistan that included Iran.  However, what 
would happen over the next year began to cement a policy of isolation and denial towards 
the Iranians and their nuclear program. 
 One incident that would begin to shift the Bush administration’s policy from 
Clinton’s engagement towards isolation and denial was the Israeli capture of the Karine A  
vessel on January 3, 2002.  This ship was loaded with weapons and munitions and 
reportedly bound for the Palestinians; the shipment violated signed accords between the 
Palestinian Authority and Israel.  The major problems for Iran, though, were the facts that 
the ship originated from Iran and that the weapons were manufactured in Iran as they 
were still in their factory crates and wrappings.
216
  While some experts argued that it was 
possibly carried out as an unauthorized smuggling operation by the Revolutionary Guards 
without the consent of the highest levels in the Iranian government,
217
 that argument was 
not considered by the Bush administration.  Shortly after the Karine A incident came the 
Axis of Evil speech delivered by President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address 
which lumped Iran into the company of Iraq and North Korea.  The impact that this type 
of statement made by President Bush, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and other key 
officials was unmistakable and understandable.  Iran began to view itself as a target of the 
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United States, and “it is precisely this perception that is driving its accelerated nuclear 
program.”218  
 The year 2003 would usher in the era of the Bush doctrine whereby the U.S. 
would utilize “preemptive force as a tool of counterproliferation” which was 
demonstrated against the Saddam Hussein regime.
219
  The ground offensive of the 2003 
Iraq War which was prosecuted based upon the belief that Saddam was pursing WMD 
was over within weeks, and it put the Iranians on notice of how the Bush administration 
would pursue its foes.  And while the Iranians understood the Iraqi chemical weapons 
posed little deterrent to U.S. forces, they did note of how the U.S. has handled a now 
nuclear capable North Korea over the years.
220
 The Iranians responded with what has 
been termed the “Grand Bargain” which placed “all the issues of major importance to the 
two sides” on the table to include the Iranian nuclear program, but according to Bush 
administration officials, it received little attention.
221
  Once Bush had completed the 
deposing of Saddam in Iraq, he turned his attention and rhetoric towards Iran and their 
nuclear program, and his policy of denying nuclear technology and isolating Iran from 
the international community began to take shape much more clearly. 
 In June of 2003, shortly after the invasion of Iraq, President Bush would state that 
in regards to Iran “we will not tolerate the construction of a nuclear weapon.  Iran would 
be dangerous if they have a nuclear weapon.  I brought this up at the G-8…..we must all 
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work together to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.”222  Merely a week 
after this statement, Bush would state that in regards to Iranian inspection compliance 
that “Iran must comply. The free world expects Iran to comply. Just leave it at that.”223  
Additionally, in June and July, Bush would begin imposing more sanctions on firms 
dealing with Iran and their nuclear program; Chinese and North Korean businesses were 
singled out by the administration for their support to Iran.
224
 
 The revelations in 2002 of previously undisclosed facilities at Natanz and Arak 
only gave the U.S. officials more ammunition to tell their European counterparts who 
resisted sanctioning under the Clinton administration “we told you so.”  It was this 
discovery that truly prompted the Bush administration’s efforts to halt progress on the 
Iranian nuclear program.  This discovery by the U.S., which was originally reported by 
the Iranian dissident group National Council of Resistance, a group aligned with the 
Iranian labeled terrorist group Mujahidin-e Khaliq (MeK), would lead to the IAEA to 
begin rigorous inspections of all the facilities reported.  The resulting inspections by the 
IAEA would culminate in an ultimatum issued to Iran on September 12, 2003 calling for 
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Iran to “provide all the details of her nuclear program” which was widely believed to 
have stemmed from pressure from the Bush administration.
225
 
 While the Bush administration was leaving the task of negotiating with the 
Iranians to the EU-3, President Bush and his administration would continue to put 
pressure on allies not to support the Iranian nuclear program.  One State Department 
official who would later become the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, John 
Bolton, would claim that the IAEA’s “Additional Protocol should be a new minimal 
standard for countries to demonstrate their nonproliferation bona fides” and that Iran had 
no need for nuclear energy.
226
  The Sa’d Abaad agreement which was discussed earlier 
that the EU-3 achieved in gaining Iran’s signature to the Additional Protocol and 
suspending uranium enrichment activities did play “into the hands of the U.S. as it kept 
Iran under pressure….that at least caused delays in its nuclear projects.”227  Additionally, 
after the Iranian agreement to the Additional Protocol, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State 
Richard Armitage stated that, “We are prepared to engage in limited discussions with the 
government of Iran about areas of mutual interest as appropriate.”228  So while the Bush 
administration and the EU-3 seemed to be using somewhat of a carrot and stick approach, 
there seemed to be very little to the carrot as nothing was offered up front to the Iranians 
such as an easing of sanctions or unfreezing of Iranian assets.  While the Sa’d Abaad 
agreement demonstrated to the international community that Iran was prepared to 
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cooperate in regards to its nuclear program by voluntarily suspending their right to 
peaceful uranium and enrichment activity, Iran’s primary gain was a delay of a serious 
confrontation with the West.
229
 
 Despite the offer of dialogue with the Iranians, the Bush administration would 
continue their policy of isolation and denial towards Iran.  In November of 2003, 
Secretary of State Colin Powell would meet with EU members to persuade them to 
declare Iran in violation of the NPT at the upcoming IAEA meeting despite a November 
12, 2003 IAEA report that showed no evidence of a secret nuclear program.
230
  In April 
of 2004, President Bush would again signal the pressure being exerted on allies to 
condemn Iran when he stated that, “One of my jobs is to make sure they (the Europeans) 
speak as plainly as possible to the Iranians and make it absolutely clear that the 
development of a nuclear weapon in Iran is intolerable, and a program is intolerable.”231  
This last statement represented a bolder step towards denial of nuclear technology as one 
sees that Bush separates the terms “nuclear weapons” and “program” with both being 
intolerable.  Later in 2004, President Bush would again convey his policy and strategy by 
stating about Iran that, “they’ve got a nuclear weapons program that they need to 
dismantle.  We’re working with other countries to encourage them to do so.”232  President 
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Bush and his administration often demonstrated their disregard for IAEA reports and 
Iran’s rights under the NPT and continued to pressure the Iranians to essentially rollback 
their nuclear program. 
 The election of Iranian President Ahmadinejad would chart an even tougher 
course against the Iranian nuclear program for the remaining three plus years of the Bush 
presidency; President Ahmadinejad would call an end to the suspension of the uranium 
enrichment agreed to in the Sa’d Abaad Agreement and resume the nuclear program’s 
activities as a result of the lack of progress of meetings with the EU-3 discussed earlier.  
Soon after the election of President Ahmadinejad, Bush would echo his previous 
statements above by saying in June 2005 that “the development of a nuclear weapon is 
unacceptable, and a process which would enable Iran to develop a nuclear weapon is 
unacceptable.”233  This policy of denial of nuclear technology just as he stated in 2004 is 
in contravention with the nature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which states in Article 
IV that “All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to 
participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and 
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”234  Just one day after 
President Bush’s statement above, he would sign Executive Order 13382 (Blocking 
Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters) which 
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froze the U.S. assets of organizations supporting the Iranian nuclear program, to include 
the AEOI.
235
 
 While the President was pursuing his policies of isolation and denial via sanctions 
and political pressure up until now, there was no overt evidence of support to regime 
change.  However, in 2005, the Iran Freedom Support Act (H.R. 6198) was to be drafted 
by Congress.  It would take until September of 2006, but President Bush would sign it 
into law authorizing himself the ability to “provide financial and political assistance 
(including the award of grants) to foreign and domestic individuals, organizations, and 
entities working for the purpose of supporting and promoting democracy for Iran.”236  
The law would give President Bush another tool in his foreign policy bag to wield against 
the Iranians.  And after Ahmadinejad and the Iranians refused “a number of economic 
and diplomatic carrots on the table in order to induce Iran to negotiate” the Bush 
administration “was able to win limited economic and weapons related sanctions against 
Iran from the UN Security Council in December 2006.”237 
   As Iran refused to comply with the UNSC’s December 2006 ultimatum to halt 
their nuclear activities to include uranium enrichment activities, the Bush administration 
capitalized on this opportunity to ratchet up the pressure to isolate the Iranian regime to 
deny nuclear related and dual use technology in 2007.  Prior to this, on April 28, 2006, 
President Bush had made a statement that caught the eye of many; he said that, “The 
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Iranians should not have a nuclear weapons, the capacity to make a nuclear weapon, or 
the knowledge as to how to make a nuclear weapon.”238  President Bush would repeat this 
statement throughout 2007 amplifying the efforts to deny any and all parts of a nuclear 
program, but the statement in and of itself is absurd.  How can we prevent Iran from 
having “the knowledge” of how to make nuclear weapons? 
 As a result of Iran’s continued refusal to cooperate with the UNSC resolution, 
Bush succeeded in passing more sanctions in October of 2007; these sanctions targeted 
Iranian financial and military institutions.
239
  A couple of months later in December of 
2007, a National Intelligence Assessment (NIE) was released that assessed “that Iran 
stopped its weapons program in 2003 and that its declared enrichment program cannot be 
converted as easily or quickly as assumed for use in a military program.”240  Regardless 
of this report, Bush administration officials, continued their demonizing rhetoric to 
isolate Ahmadinejad who continued defying a UN mandate to suspend uranium 
enrichment.  A statement by Defense Secretary Robert Gates continued the calls for 
Iranian isolation and denial by saying that, “The international community must continue 
– and intensify – our economic, financial, and diplomatic pressures on Iran to suspend 
enrichment.” 241 
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 Bush’s final year in office would see the continuance of the previous year’s 
strategies. Beginning with his first radio address of the new year he would state that 
during an upcoming trip to the Middle East he would “discuss the importance of 
countering the aggressive ambitions of Iran.”242  Slightly more than a month later Bush 
would tout the acquisition of a mysterious laptop that proved Iranian intentions for a 
nuclear weapons program.  The Bush administration would again petition the UNSC to 
approve another round of sanctions against Iran, and on March 3, 2008, the UNSC would 
approve this third round of sanctions directed at more dual use goods bound for Iran.
243
 
Despite opportunities between the U.S., EU, and Iran to open up talks on the nuclear 
program, President Bush and his officials insist on their “poison pill offer of talks only on 
the condition that Iran stop its nuclear enrichment activities first.”244  Obviously this 
supposed carrot and stick approach did not present the Iranians with a large enough 
carrot; had the offer of talks been granted without the precondition of suspension, there 
would’ve likely been an impasse.   
 Bush officials were just not interested in granting concessions during their tenure, 
and during the remainder of 2008 his administration would work in concert with the EU 
to target more Iranian organizations and businesses for sanctions.  These additional 
sanctions would include the Iranian maritime, agricultural, and medical industries 
accused of serving as fronts for the Iranian nuclear program, and inspections of ships and 
airplanes enroute to Iran would also be increased.  Even major Russian arms exporter 
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Rosoboronesport would fall victim to sanctions by the United States for dealings with the 
Iranian nuclear program.
245
  And in October of 2008, another Bush ally, Australia, would 
be convinced by the U.S. to enact its own sanctions against Iran.
246
   
 After eight years of the Bush administration’s targeting of Iran, the attempts at 
isolation were growing stronger, but their nuclear program was not slowing.  Bush’s  
policies of denial and isolation against the Iranians appear to have had no impact on the 
progress of the Iranian nuclear program as the previous history section shows.  Another 
look back at Figure 1 shows that from 2007 to the Obama inauguration in 2009, Iran went 
from no operating centrifuges to nearly 4,000; this is certainly indicative of Bush’s 
ineffective policies towards Iran and its nuclear program.  His “tendency to utter 
ineffectual threats, or draw redlines, which it could not enforce, or threaten to implement 
sanctions in the Security Council,” which were watered down, was further crippled by the 
dramatic rise in oil prices between 2005 and 2008 that provided much more revenues to 
Iran.
247
   
 Bush’s policies from 2005 forward were countered at every turn by Iran’s 
President Ahmadinejad.  Iran was no longer in the weak position in 2005 as opposed to 
the year 2003 when the Sa’d Abaad Agreement was signed and the Grand Bargain was 
offered to the U.S.  Ahmadinejad’s strategy capitalized on U.S. weakness in the region 
and Iran’s strengths.  As discussed earlier, Ahmadinejad took advantage of not just the 
growing insurgency in Iraq that was seeing increased U.S. casualties, but he also took 
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advantage of the United States’ decreased moral position in the world and in the Middle 
East.  The U.S. had backed away from the Arab-Israeli conflict so much that Hamas was 
elected into the Palestinian parliament in January of 2006 which damaged their position 
in the region, and with no weapons of mass destruction discovered in Iraq and the Abu 
Ghareb abuses making headlines, world opinion of the U.S was on the decline.  More 
importantly the nuclear program and his conflict with the West served as a “means to a 
domestic political end” for Ahmadinejad.248   His strategy was to boost his political 
position in Iran by “championing himself as a latter-day – more devout – Mossadeq, a 
champion of Iran’s national interests in the face of extraordinary odds.”249   
 Ahmadinejad halted the cooperation agreed upon in the Sa’d Abaad Agreement of 
2003, and Iran has continued its nuclear activity ever since citing their rights under the 
NPT to a peaceful nuclear program.  However when Iran was referred to the UNSC,  
Ahmadinejad demonstrated that he “did not care”; he strongly believed that the EU-3 and 
the IAEA were unjust processes because they were being strong armed by the U.S.
250
  As 
a result of this belief, Iran and Ahmadinejad looked to China and Russia to protect Iran 
from serious sanctions by the UN. 
 One other key belief underlying Ahmadinejad’s policy is that U.S. power has 
been in a decline, and U.S. involvement in Iraq was the perfect example.  Ahmadinejad 
capitalized on the Abu Ghareb scandal to show how the U.S. was morally bankrupt, and 
unfortunately for Bush, the Iraqi invasion had the opposite effect on Iran that he desired 
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as the moral corruptness of a U.S. occupied Iraq discouraged the Iranians from a 
democratic revolution.
251
  Ahmadinejad’s election also gave Iranian sponsored militias in 
Iraq such as the Badr Corps a freer hand to create mischief and cause problems for U.S. 
forces; keeping the U.S. troops bogged down in a conflict in Iran meant that  Bush would 
be less likely to look for a military conflict with Iran.  Additionally, keeping U.S. troops 
embroiled in a conflict in which casualties rose sharply in 2006 and generated a 2007 
troop surge made the U.S. public war weary.  This meant that Ahmadinejad would be 
more likely to have a greater percentage of the U.S. public opposed to any conflict in 
Iran. 
 President Bush certainly had a difficult time with the radical Ahmadinejad.  His 
harsh rhetoric since the Bush administration has not stopped, and the Obama 
administration would have the difficult task of finding a way to coax the Iranian leader to 
the negotiating table.  The election of President Barack Obama would represent another 
shift in U.S. policy toward Iran, but how would it impact the Iranian nuclear program? 
 
Obama’s Twenty Months 
 The election of President Obama in 2008 brought about more talk of change in the 
approach to Iran from both sides of the argument.  After Obama’s election victory and in 
the two months leading up to his inauguration, there appeared to be an opening for 
renewed diplomacy between the two sides.  A close look at President Obama and his 
administration’s actions yields some significant differences from his predecessor’s often 
inconsistent and ill-fated attempts to undermine the Iranian nuclear program. 
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 On January 26, 2009, just days after his inauguration, President Obama stated in 
an interview with  the Al-Arabiya TV network that “if countries like Iran are willing to 
unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us.”252  Yet on that same day his 
UN Ambassador Susan Rice trumpeted the requirement of suspended enrichment activity 
before talks could resume between the U.S. and Iran; it is doubtful that this indicated an 
“extended hand” to Iran.  On March 20, 2009, the Persian New Year, President Obama 
sent his regards to the Iranians by offering the “promise of a new beginning…grounded 
in mutual respect.”253  The two statements issued by President Obama himself are 
certainly indicative of what some referred to as his “Iranian charm offensive,” and they 
were two of many that came directly from President Obama and were intended for 
Iranian consumption.  
 One of the starkest differences between the Obama administration and Bush 43 
was President Obama’s concerted efforts to restore the U.S. position as the moral 
authority in the world.  The debacle of Abu Ghareb, lack of WMD being found in Iraq, 
Guantanamo Bay’s detention facility, and other factors had eroded America’s moral 
position in the world.  Obama immediately sought to correct this, and though his 
speeches in Cairo and around the world may have accomplished this to some extent, his 
position at home was criticized by some who felt it displayed America as weak rather 
than strong.  However Obama believed engagement was the best policy for Iran. 
 Within the first year of Obama’s Presidency he succeeded in getting Iran to the 
negotiating table over the nuclear program after an Iranian request to the IAEA to provide 
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more fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), now primarily used for medical 
purposes.  In early October 2009, senior officials from the U.S., Iran, and the other states 
from the P5+1 (UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany) met in Geneva for discussions 
where Iran tentatively agreed to a U.S. proposal to swap Iranian LEU for replacement 
fuel for the TRR.
254
  The deal involved multiple countries with Russia enriching the 
uranium to the necessary level, 19.75%, and France fashioning the Russian enriched LEU 
into fuel rods to be used for medical radioisotopes.
255
  The deal presented Iran with a 
golden opportunity to demonstrate that their program was legitimate, and Obama went to 
the UN Security Council to request amendments to resolutions that forbade this export of 
Iranian LEU.
256
  However, three weeks later, Iran reneged on the conditions of the deal 
and refused to transfer the requested amount of LEU to Russia; Iran countered with a 
request to receive the fuel rods before giving up their uranium and also refused to part 
with the whole 1,200kg that was requested to be transferred to Russia.
257
  On January 2, 
2010, Ahmadinejad would give the U.S. and the West one month to reply to Iran’s 
counter-offer; in the event of no response, he stated that Iran would enrich the uranium to 
the necessary levels themselves which they began on February 9, 2010 at the Natanz pilot 
fuel-enrichment plant.
258
   
 As a result of Iran’s new enrichment activity which violated the IAEA safeguards 
agreement, the new IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano would issue a report claiming 
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that Iran was not sufficiently cooperating and that Iranian activities raised “concern about 
the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the 
development of a nuclear payload for a missile.”259  Obama’s initial foray into engaging 
Iran while appearing to be a failure to some demonstrated to the world that the U.S. was 
in fact prepared to negotiate with Iran.  But this time it was Iran who backed away from 
the table; this incident would give the U.S. a degree of justification to seek sanctions 
later. 
 Obama’s friendly overtures to Iran and President Ahmadinejad over the nuclear 
program ultimately achieved nothing in its effort to slow the program; the end result of 
the Obama administration’s efforts to engage has been no more promising than his 
predecessors.  The argument could be made that Ahmadinejad viewed Obama’s overtures 
as a victory, and therefore there has been no need for him to turn away from his strategy 
of defiance and confronting the West.  But some experts, Shahram Chubin included, 
contend that Obama’s offer to engage Iran without preconditions regarding the nuclear 
program have limited the Ahmadinejad regime’s ability to “portray the United States as a 
bogeyman bent on destabilizing the regime.”260  The first President of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, states that, “Obama’s non-confrontational policy 
withdrew this gift (referring to the Bush administration’s confrontational stance toward 
Iran) and created the political space for Iranians to oppose the regime.”261  Despite 
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Obama’s efforts, Iran has refused to cooperate at the negotiating table; President Obama, 
in a statement in March 2010 marking Nowruz, the Persian New Year, stated that Iran’s 
leaders greeted his “extended hand” with a “clenched fist.”262 
 With Iran again rebuffing Obama’s continued attempts at dialogue and 
disregarding UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), unfortunately, Obama began to 
turn back to George W. Bush’s strategies of increasing sanctions which have been 
historically ineffective.  In May 2010, Obama’s democratic led Congress was in the final 
stages of reconciling both the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act and the 
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009 targeting 
Iran’s importation of gasoline, and the bills were quickly touted as effective when several 
companies withdrew their business deals with Iran.
263
  In addition to the U.S. sanctions, 
the Obama administration also tabled more sanctions at the UN aimed at Iran, and in June 
of 2010, UNSCR 1929 was passed.  This resolution prohibits Iran from acquiring 
interests in “uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technology…in 
particular uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, all heavy water activities or 
technology related to ballistic missiles,” and it also directs that states shall prevent 
supplying Iran with a multitude of conventional weapons systems.
264
 
 However, it is because of past sanctions that Iran has been planning for the onset 
of more severe sanctions; over the past few years Iran has reduced its foreign imports of 
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refined oil from 40% to 30% of its domestic fuel consumption requirements.
265
  Iran 
began a rationing program for gasoline that, according to Farid Ameri, head of the Iranian 
state petroleum distribution company, has reduced gasoline imports from 5.8 to 4.7 
million gallons per day since January.
266
 Also important is the fact that Ahmadinejad has 
used the threat of sanctions to pass reforms to the state’s massive domestic subsidy 
programs; fortunately for him the sanctions will make it easier for him to remove the 
subsidies and blame the U.S. and the West for higher prices on goods to include gasoline 
which will rally Iranians around the regime with America again being the bogeyman.
267
  
It is this notion of Iran against the world that maintains the Ahmadinejad regime in 
power; it solidifies Persian nationalism against opponents of Iran’s independence, the one 
element of the Iranian constitution that the leadership can cling to.  Increased sanctions 
from the U.S. and the United Nations will not only be ineffective but they will be 
counterproductive because, in the words of Bani-Sadr, “the threat of international crisis is 
the Iranian regime’s only remaining resource for legitimizing its despotic power.”268 
 Considering the statements made by Chubin and Bani-Sadr above, one begins to 
understand the method to President Ahmadinejad’s madness.  The outrageous statements 
made by Ahmadinejad about the Holocaust and regarding a 9/11 conspiracy during a 
U.N. address in New York City are calculated to continue the conflict with the West.  
Ahmadinejad knows that a non-confrontational stance by Obama will jeopardize his 
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regime and embolden his adversaries so he makes outlandish statements like he did in 
New York City on September 23, 2010 in order to increase the likelihood of conflict.  For 
President Obama, compromising with an Iranian President who implies that 9/11 was an 
American conspiracy becomes next to impossible if not outright political suicide.  Obama 
has come under pressure from many officials in the U.S. who have the “see, I told you 
so” attitude and do not believe that Ahmadinejad is a rational actor.  On the contrary, 
though, Ahmadinejad’s words and actions are calculated.  Confrontation thus has become 
almost inevitable, and it is this confrontation with the U.S. that is the “fondest hope” of 
Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, Ahmadinejad and his Revolutionary Guards.269 
 Despite the sanctions, the Iranians have continued to make extensive progress in 
their nuclear program during Obama’s time in office.  In May 2010, as mentioned 
previously, an agreement was reached for acquiring fuel for the Tehran reactor; the deal 
negotiated by Turkey and Brazil to give Iran assurances for nuclear fuel added legitimacy 
to Iran’s position in negotiations.  And at the end of August 2010, the Russians loaded 
fuel into the Bushehr reactor marking a step towards bringing the plant online for the first 
time.  Each of these incidents represented huge steps forward for Iran’s nuclear program.  
 President Obama’s short time on this problem has also been plagued by 
accusations from within his own cabinet, namely Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, that 
the administration has no effective policy towards the Iranian’s nuclear progress or an 
effective strategy to counter an Iran with nuclear weapons.  Obama was referred to by Ali 
Rahnema, Iran expert at the American University of Paris, as an “unguided missile” 
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looking to justify any and all actions which he takes.
270
  Accusations from within his 
cabinet in conjunction with the eventual reliance upon previously ineffective strategies of 
sanctions and political pressure do not bode well for a diplomatic solution on the Iranian 
nuclear program in the near term.  The administration has even recently been going back 
to one of the favorite Bush phrases of “all options are on the table;” a truly astounding 
development considering the stark political differences between Obama and Bush 43. 
 One of these “options” has frequently been viewed as a strike on Iran’s nuclear 
facilities, but does this translate to a military strike?  In late September of 2010, a 
computer worm referred to as “Stuxnet” was found to have begun infecting computers 
located in Iran’s Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.271  Interestingly enough, the computer 
worm appears to be targeting Iranian computers much more frequently than those of 
other states; roughly 60% of Stuxnet infections have surfaced in Iran while there have 
been no reported infections in the United States.
272
  While there is speculation as to the 
origin of the attack, James Lewis, a cyber security expert from the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, argues that the U.S., Israel, and U.K. are the leading suspects in 
the attack.
273
  Though unconfirmed, some researchers have released information that a 
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file within the worm contains a word, Myrtus, which leads them to believe Israel is the 
most likely perpetrator of the attack because of its biblical origins.
274
 
 Regardless of which state perpetrated the attack, it is probable that the Obama 
administration was well aware of the plan.  Robert Langner, a German computer security 
expert, has called Stuxnet “a precision, military-grade cyber missile deployed early last 
year (2009) to seek out and destroy one real-world target of high importance.”275  So 
could the Obama administration have turned to sabotage as engagement was not yielding 
positive results?  Whether or not this is the case, considering that the worm was released 
in 2009, another issue must be discussed – Iran’s centrifuge problems over the past year.   
 As the computer worm has only been discovered recently, there was little 
speculation that a computer worm caused Iran’s technical difficulties last year at the 
Natanz facility.  Iran’s number of centrifuges in operation reportedly dropped by 23% 
between May 2009 and January 2010.
276
  It is likely that the export controls on 
technology shipments to Iran have forced Iran to purchase illicit materials which were 
“tampered with through Western covert operations in order to induce problems down the 
line.”277  Though there is no concrete proof that the Stuxnet worm caused the centrifuge 
difficulties at Natanz, the evidence certainly points in that direction.  Considering that the 
U.S. is one of the few states known to have an offensively geared cyber capability, it is 
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also conceivable that the Obama administration sanctioned this “attack” over a military 
strike which would have proven much more problematic. 
 Obama’s policy of engagement took a drastic detour away from that of his 
predecessor George W. Bush.  Despite what could eventually become a victory by 
Obama’s policies in Iran, it is still too early to fully gauge what will transpire.  The 
bottom line is that Iran has yet to suspend or halt enrichment activity.  Their nuclear 
program continues to advance, though the introduction of a cyber attack to the equation 
has created some difficulties for the regime and has potentially stalled the Bushehr plant 
from becoming fully operational.  If Obama can avoid legitimizing the Ahmadinejad 
regime amongst his citizens through confrontation, his efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear 
program will be successful. 
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CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 So how effective, in the past thirty plus years, has the U.S. been at checking Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions?  This program has certainly not come about overnight.  U.S. 
administrations have used policies of containment, engagement, isolation, and denial 
when it comes to the Iranian program.  The effectiveness of these attempts over past and 
the current administration is certainly in question.  I contend that evidence revealed above 
has demonstrated that the U.S. policies towards the Iranian nuclear program and regime 
have been ineffective, counterproductive, and even potentially harmful to efforts at 
halting Iran’s acquisition of a civil nuclear program (to which they are entitled under the 
NPT anyways) and to the more worrisome potential goal of nuclear weapons.  With this 
in mind, I contend that my original hypothesis that U.S. policies have been ineffective in 
halting theadvancement of the Iranian nuclear program is valid.  A new U.S. policy 
towards engaging Iran must be undertaken to ensure the order of a volatile region whose 
access is vital to so many. 
 Since the Islamic Revolution, the U.S. and Iran have operated on opposite ends of 
the political spectrum, and U.S. policies have done little to counter what is potentially an 
extraordinary threat to Middle East security, the Iranian nuclear program.  While Reagan 
and the first President Bush paid little attention to the program, progress was moving 
along quickly and publicly one might argue.  Little was made of the program then, but 
today there is little acknowledgement of Iran’s need for nuclear energy.  Our policies 
have focused on one thing and one thing alone, the nuclear weapon.  The focus on Iran’s 
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potential for developing a nuclear weapon has proven ineffective in halting the 
advancement of their nuclear program as the IAEA has continually failed to find such 
evidence. 
 Before Obama, U.S. policies of engagement offered far too little to make talks 
with the Iranians worthwhile; and U.S. administrations since the Iranian Revolution, with 
the exception of the Obama administration, have demanded full acquiescence to our 
desires without considering Iranian sovereignty, let alone needs.  Engagement failed to 
take into account the domestic political situation in Iran that has been so unstable; we 
have failed to strike a balance between constructive engagement and containment which 
has harmed our moderate Iranian allies domestically.  Prior to Obama it has been since 
the late years of the Clinton administration that a U.S. administration made a concerted 
effort at engaging the Iranians, but it may be too late.   
 Containment and denial of nuclear technology also failed as enforcing all of the 
sanctions we had enacted were next to impossible; there was no agency designed to 
monitor all of the international trade flowing in and out of Iran.  U.S. administrations also 
didn’t effectively calculate the financial benefits to be had by states bypassing sanctions; 
the risk was worth the reward for many states and their companies.  Just see table 3 below 
for a list of all the states that chose to risk U.S. sanctions for the profits to be had; these 
investments were after President Clinton’s enactment of the ILSA.  What was likely the 
most damaging prior to the ILSA was that we undercut our position by continuing high 
levels of trade with Iran while berating other states for doing the same; such a 
hypocritical stance was easily recognizable and not respected in the international 
community.  These policies and strategies were terribly ineffective, and Iran began to 
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receive its initial support for the nuclear program during Clinton’s push for “Dual 
Containment.” 
Table 3: Post-1999 Major Investment/Developments in Iran's Energy Sector
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Table 3: Post-1999 Major Investment/Developments in Iran's Energy Sector(Cont) 
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 Table 3: Post-1999 Major Investment/Developments in Iran's Energy Sector (Cont) 
 
  
 Even more important has been that the sanctions that the U.S. has consistently 
imposed over the years have been criticized as “an extraterritorial application of national 
law….in other words they are blatantly illegal.”278  They have created additional 
problems for foreign policy with some of our most important allies.  Britain and other EU 
states have threatened to complain to the World Trade Organization if the U.S. ever 
applies these sanctions to one of their companies.
279
  To put it bluntly, these sanctions are 
terrible foreign policy and have not succeeded in slowing the Iranian nuclear program; 
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they have merely created another antagonizing hurdle preventing constructive 
engagement with Iran over many issues to include the nuclear program.  Though the 
continued sanctions have harmed Iran and their energy infrastructure, “Iran will not 
collapse because of decreased revenues” due to sanctions; they will merely blame 
“sanctions and foreign enemies for any difficulties.”280  Any new application of sanctions 
against Iran will be of limited or no utility in altering Iran’s behavior just as past 
sanctions have failed.
281
 
 The importance of this particular body of research is twofold.  First, this research 
gives an exhaustive examination of the economic justifications for Iran’s program.  It lays 
the groundwork for why U.S. policies should be more open to the idea of a nuclear 
program in addition to the simple fact that the pursuit of a peaceful nuclear program is a 
right of Iran as a signatory to the NPT under Article IV (see Appendix 1).  The Iranian 
economy is dependent upon its natural resources; the evidence above displays just that.   
The fact that American administrations have conveniently discarded that argument is one 
of the primary reasons for Iran’s belligerence over the progress of their nuclear program. 
 Perhaps the most important information garnered comes from a thorough 
examination of the most current exchanges between the Obama administration and Iran.  
These exchanges have built upon previous exchanges between the two states, but I 
contend that it is evident how Obama has attempted to chart a different path – a non-
confrontational path – with the Iranian state.  Obama extended his hand to Iran even 
before he was President.  However, it is critical that Obama remain on this path; resorting 
to the ineffective strategies of sanctions, political pressure, and military threats will not 
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yield the desired result – a transparent and peaceful Iranian nuclear program.  Despite the 
caustic rhetoric coming from Iran’s President Ahmadinejad who is attempting to incite 
more confrontation, President Obama must find a way to stay the course; this will be the 
only way to prevent a more severe confrontation which could justify Iran’s withdrawal 
from the NPT or acquisition of a nuclear weapon.  The implication to be had from this is 
that Obama’s policies must evolve from past administration’s examples; if not, we can 
expect more of the same from Iran. 
 While this particular research has focused on U.S. policies primarily in the past, it 
is not difficult to make the conclusion that the Iranian regime is a major part of the 
nuclear problem.  The regime relies upon this notion of Iranian independence to remain 
in power, and as stated earlier, conflict with the U.S. only assists their efforts.  So I 
believe that research following in this direction could focus on how to bridge a gap 
between advocating for democracy in Iran without appearing to interfere in Iran’s affairs.  
How can the U.S. effectively achieve a sense of neutrality in Iran’s affairs while at the 
same time promoting the same freedom that the Iranian constitution advocates?  Regime 
reform to a more transparent and open government represents the best path to an Iranian 
nuclear program that poses no threat to the region or international community.   While 
much of the focus in this body of research has focused on the words and deeds of Iranian 
Presidents in the regime, most significantly those of the current President Ahmadinejad, it 
is important to briefly discuss how different regime elements are involved in the decision 
making process when it comes to the Iranian nuclear program.  First of all, I must 
concede that Ahmadinejad does not have the final say when it comes to the nuclear 
program.  He is, however, the mouthpiece by which all of the decision makers to speak to 
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the international community as evidenced by his speeches referring to the nuclear 
program as a “train without brakes” and calling the nuclear issue a matter to be taken up 
with the IAEA and not a political one.   
 Multiple elements of the Iranian political apparatus have a say in the state of 
Iran’s nuclear program.  These include the Guardian Council, the President, and most 
importantly, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei. The Supreme Leader 
also controls Iran’s Revolutionary Guards who play a large role in carrying out nuclear 
planning and operations in Iran.  Ultimately, though, it is the Supreme Leader who 
controls the foreign policy of the Iranian state.  It is he who “makes all the key policy 
decisions, usually after Iran’s major centers of power, including the presidency, have 
reached a consensus.”282  So while President Ahmadinejad certainly speaks with the 
approval of the Supreme Leader and his policies in mind, it is important for U.S. 
policymakers not to put too much stock into the President’s power and his often 
controversial comments.  Our policy experts must understand that much of what is said 
by Ahmadinejad is aimed for domestic consumption rather than international 
consumption as the Iranian leadership is focused on preserving its regime and shoring up 
nationalistic support via the nuclear program. 
 U.S. policy makers must heed the words and deeds of the Supreme Leader.  Too 
much attention is garnered to the actions of Ahmadinejand (myself included) because he 
is the “frontman” and most visible proponent for the nuclear program.  While he is the 
most visible and outspoken, but he cannot change Iran’s foreign policy.  “Only 
Khamenei, the ultimate decider, can do that,” and he will only do so with widespread 
support from the “major centers of power” in Iran which does include President 
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Ahmadinejad.
283
  So with these key points in mind, it is important for U.S. policymakers 
to understand who will make the final decision on any changes to Iran’s nuclear program, 
and that one individual is the Supreme Leader. 
U.S. policies and strategies which have included sanctions, political pressure, threats of 
military actions, and now possibly a cyber attack towards the Iranian nuclear program 
have not effectively attained the goal of halting Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology.  The 
Iranian nuclear program has surpassed goal after goal and stands on the precipice of a 
fully functioning Bushehr reactor and the ability to enrich uranium to weapons grade 
levels.  And while Iran touts the civilian nature of the program due to the legitimate 
economic and energy needs of their state, considering their almost certain desire for a 
strategic deterrent there is little doubting that one of their next milestones will be to attain 
the capability to assemble a nuclear weapon.  So what policies and strategies can be 
developed that can effective cope Iran’s desire for nuclear technology?  This will be the 
subject of the final chapter: A Way Ahead. 
 Before proceeding to the final chapter and my recommendations, I feel this is the 
most opportune time to clear the air on my personal thoughts regarding the direction and 
purpose of the Iranian nuclear program.  The evidence that I have presented in this 
research is certainly strongly favorable to the economic rationale of Iran’s nuclear 
program.  And while the security rationale for the nuclear program is also 
comprehendible, there can be no denying the economic rationality of pursuing nuclear 
power in Iran.  Despite these facts, I do in fact believe that Iran’s ultimate goal is a 
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nuclear weapon.  The economic rationale may be overwhelming, but it also makes for a 
convenient disguise and excuse for the Iranian leadership to pursue its nuclear program.   
 As stated earlier, Iran’s economic rationale is sound, but the security rationale is 
much more overarching and has more profound and immediate ramifications for the 
survival of the state and the regime.  Iran understands the role that nuclear weapons play 
in national security strategies, and they know that states with nuclear weapons have never 
gone to war with one another.  Iran wants to cement their independence in stone and 
prevent the interference in their sovereign affairs that they are so paranoid of.   
 Now I am not saying that Iran is going to develop a nuclear weapon as soon as 
possible, or that they have a multitude of secret facilities enriching uranium in secret to 
weapons grade levels.  However, what I do believe is that Iran wants to possess the 
breakout capability to assemble a nuclear weapon in a very short timeframe, say in thirty 
to ninety days.  Iran has already done the hard work in enriching uranium to LEU; 
progressing to weapons grade uranium takes much less time.  If Iran were to be 
threatened by another state, perhaps the United States, Iran could cite its right to 
withdraw from the NPT in accordance with Article X (see Appendix 1) in order to 
preserve their state’s survival.  At that time they would then assemble the nuclear weapon 
which would send a clear message to present a significant deterrent to adversaries.  
 The Iranian leadership is determined to assert its independence.  Joining the 
nuclear club is a huge step, but preventing future acts of interference in Iran’s affairs is 
paramount.  Possession of a nuclear deterrent is imperative in the leaders’ minds 
especially with a nuclear Israel on their doorstep who has threatened action against Iran 
for their support of Hamas and Hezbollah.  The fact is that Iran’s “lack of transparency 
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and cooperation with the IAEA and resistance” 284  to negotiations with the United States 
and its allies leads me to my inescapable conclusion that Iran seeks a nuclear weapons 
capability. In the words of former President Rafsanjani, “We possess nuclear technology 
that is not operationalized yet.  Any time we decide to weaponize it, we can do so rather 
quickly.”285  Despite my belief that Iran does in fact have its sights set on nuclear 
weapons, I argue there is a course of action that can be undertaken to satisfy all parties. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS: A WAY AHEAD 
 
 As stated earlier, the U.S. and the West should concede that Iran has the right to 
peacefully develop nuclear technology as stated in Article IV of the NPT, and their 
economic justifications are valid.  Without nuclear power, Iran is staring at an economic 
meltdown of epic proportions over the coming decade.  But Iran must realize that their 
continued ambivalence toward the West will win them no allies, and reestablishing ties 
with the West will open their energy sector to unhindered investment. 
 The policies and strategies that have been undertaken by U.S. administrations 
over the past three decades display what could likely be considered the most ineffective 
attempts at foreign policy in U.S. history.  Why these policies were chosen certainly was 
never my intention to discuss, but it is likely that somewhere along the way some policy 
analysts convinced senior leaders that particular policies and strategies would achieve the 
desired effect.  Unfortunately, unless they intended for the U.S. to be faced with a nuclear 
Iran today, their recommendations were faulty to say the least.  What I propose below is a 
comprehensive roadmap which I contend comprises of the most pressing issues 
surrounding the current impasse between the United States and Iran.   I argue that without  
seriously addressing these issues there will be little chance for progress between the U.S. 
and Iran on the nuclear issue. 
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America’s Responsibilities 
 First and foremost, the U.S. must begin an effort to resume normal diplomatic 
relations with Iran.  This may simply begin with a U.S. interests section in Iran, but it 
must evolve into a full functioning U.S. Embassy in Tehran.  It has been more than thirty 
years since the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis; we no longer need to harbor animosity over 
this.  Iranian leaders, specifically President Khatami, have conceded that the hostage 
taking was probably a mistake.  Restarting diplomatic relations is certainly not so simple, 
and it will not immediately tear down the walls of mistrust that exist between the two 
states.  However, it will immediately open direct channels of communication between the 
administrations on the nuclear issue among others, and it would also open the door to 
increased security cooperation on a number of other regional concerns such as Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and drug trafficking, all of which the U.S. and Iran generally agree upon. 
This would likely be such a significant step that it would reduce Iran’s hostility to 
candidly discussing their nuclear program.
286
  The U.S. must make a concerted effort so 
shake off this perception of being the “bogeyman.” 
 Along with efforts to reestablish diplomatic relations and serious negotiations 
regarding the Iranian nuclear program, there must be a halt to the conditional nature of 
talks with Iran.  Iran has made numerous gestures of goodwill over the years by halting 
uranium enrichment while awaiting the West to craft genuine incentive laden proposals to 
ensure Iran does not have an indigenous full nuclear cycle.  We must not forget that it is 
within Iran’s right in accordance with Article IV of the NPT to research and develop a 
peaceful nuclear program as detailed in Appendix 1; their uranium enrichment programs 
and other nuclear facilities have not been found in violation by IAEA inspectors to this 
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date.  Certainly there have been some irregularities with the Iranian program as discussed 
earlier, but the IAEA has found no “smoking gun” that would indicate a current violation 
of the NPT let alone pursuit of nuclear weapons.  For U.S. leaders to continue asserting 
that Iran must relinquish their rights granted to them as one of the original signatories to 
the NPT could be considered arrogant at best and possibly even foolish.  Throwing out 
the conditions that have prevented serious discussions would be a step in the right 
direction, but this is where difficulties will arise. 
 In addition to the first two measures, the U.S. must begin to scale back, if not 
completely eliminate the sanctions that have targeted Iran and other countries doing 
business with the Iranian nuclear establishment. The bottom line up front on the sanctions 
which are meant to force Iran to the negotiating table is that they will have the opposite 
effect; sanctions will impact ordinary Iranians whose distrust of the U.S. and West will be 
intensified thus strengthening the Iranian regime’s ability to refuse to submit to the 
sanctions.
287
  These measures have not significantly impacted the Iranian regime’s ability 
to further their nuclear program.  The majority of the pain caused by these sanctions has 
been exacted on the very citizens the United States seeks to court in an effort to 
overthrow the hard-line regime.  Additionally, the record high prices for oil over the past 
three to five years have filled the Iranian coffers with funds to further their nuclear efforts 
and blunt the impact of sanctions.  Unfortunately, the sanctions have also become a 
convenient excuse for the regime for why progress is not being made; they consider it a 
cost of maintaining their Iranian independence.  The sanctions have simply played into 
the hands of the leadership and reduced the moderates’ positions to bystanders scratching 
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their heads at U.S. efforts.  Sanctions only permit the Iranian regime to place the blame 
for their internal problems squarely upon the shoulders of the United States thereby 
making us, as I have stated before, the bogeyman. 
 Additionally, sanctions have been circumvented by those states that we should 
consider critical in this negotiation process, Russia and China.  While a number of 
sanctions resolutions have passed through the United Nations, each time the measures 
become watered down and reduced to nearly meaningless attempts to constrain the 
Iranians while permitting Russia and China to carry out business as usual there.  As 
already mentioned earlier, Russia has supported the Bushehr reactor, and China has most 
recently come under scrutiny for several of its energy companies such as Chinaoil and 
Sinopec, violating U.S. sanctions while doing business in Iran.  In addition to Russia and 
China striking multi-billion dollar deals with Iran, India also reached a $40 billion deal to 
develop Iranian oil fields.
288
   
 Multiple other states and their companies have also gotten into the business of 
investing in Iran.  Most recently, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan stated on September 
16, 2010 that Turkey would attempt to triple trade volume over the next five years; 
Turkish-Iran trade has surged from $1 billion in 2000 to $10 billion over the past year.
289
  
Nearly 80% of that trade is Iranian natural gas flowing to Turkey.
290
  Swiss firm EGL 
also reportedly signed an 18 billion Euro gas contract with the National Iranian Gas 
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Export Company even though U.S. sanctions are in place.
291
  See table 3 above for a list 
of all the companies who have invested in the Iranian energy sector regardless of the 
potential of U.S. sanctions.  Sanctions, while exerting some pain on the Iranian economy, 
have not succeeded as a whole and are not achieving the goal of halting the Iranian 
nuclear program; they only stand to harm the U.S. position in the international 
community.  And while there is a desire by some in both the State Department and the  
Obama administration to specifically pressure Russia, China, and other partners to halt 
their sanctions busting behavior, I contend that such a step on the part of the U.S. would 
likely push these key powers further away from the U.S. and squarely into the Iran camp. 
 
Iran’s Responsibilities  
 Iran is not in line for a “get out of jail free” card here despite what may be 
interpreted as pro-Iran viewpoint in this research.  Iran owes the international community 
some guarantees of its own if it wishes to join the nuclear club.  Pushing forward against 
the will of the West has not been a strategy that has won Iran or Ahmadinejad many allies 
in the West.  His radical comments about the Holocaust, Israel, and 9/11 have made many 
skeptical of Iranian intentions.   
 The first gesture of goodwill on Iran’s part must demonstrate a commitment to 
transparency in their nuclear program’s activities.  For the U.S., its allies, and the rest of 
the world to continue to receive evidence of secret Iranian nuclear facilities from 
dissidents such as the MeK would be unacceptable.  Complete disclosure of any and all 
nuclear related facilities will immediately stall those who call for military strikes and 
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increased sanctioning against Iran.  There will definitely be those that insist Iran is still 
hiding something, but we cannot expect to win over the most ardent of the anti-Iran 
camp.  This transparency would comprise of several important components. 
  Iran must adopt and ratify the Additional Protocol of the IAEA; these measures 
will provide a degree of comfort to the international community that Iran is serious about 
not pursuing nuclear weapons, which I am skeptical about myself.  Iran must also 
honestly address the numerous reported documents concerning past Iranian nuclear 
weapons research to include the document on uranium hemispheres for nuclear warheads 
that has been found to be credible by the IAEA.
292
  The continued assertion that these 
documents are fraudulent without addressing the reasons behind their claim is not 
sufficient.  The last measure that would improve Iranian transparency will not be so easy 
to overcome; remote camera based monitoring should be a necessity for Iranian nuclear 
facilities to verify peaceful intentions and provide early warning in the event that the 
Iranian regime deviates from their stated desire.  This measure will represent a criterion 
above and beyond IAEA inspection techniques in other parts of the world and may be 
seen as unjust, but due to the difficult nature of travel into and within Iran, unannounced 
inspections cannot be reasonably expected to be truly unannounced.
293
  
 As the West is fearful of Iran maintaining an indigenous nuclear capability within 
its own borders with minimal monitoring and Iran refusing to relinquish its right to a 
peaceful nuclear program, there appears to be only one solution: the multinational 
facility.  This type of facility was offered by Iran in the 2005 negotiations, and it would 
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provide the best transparency possible as other states would participate in the daily 
operations of these facilities.
294
  And as late as the year 2008, even EU leader Javier 
Solana lauded this proposal.
295
  These facilities would provide Iran with a reliable fuel 
supply to operate its reactors while assuaging their energy concerns plus it could serve as 
a production facility for LEU to power nuclear reactors to participating states and 
possibly the entire Middle East.  As Iran touts itself as a regional power that is bent on 
peace and justice, it can begin to display this by ushering in and recommitting itself to the 
proverbial Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons. 
 One of the more complicated areas of this problem concerns something that is a 
potential side effect of a nuclear Iran – a regional arms race.  States such as Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, and Jordan could feel threatened by a nuclear Iran, peaceful or not, and they may 
choose to seek out nuclear weapons.  It is important for the U.S. and other world powers 
to engage these states to discourage this behavior.  The U.S. has already made a deal to 
provide Saudi Arabia with upwards of $60 billion in arms with potential sales to other 
Gulf states estimated at nearly $100 billion.
296
  While these actions are capitalizing on 
fears of a nuclear Iran and potential war, they provide these states with a measure of 
conventional security that will hopefully stall if not prevent the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons. 
 There are other pieces to this puzzle that will also facilitate an acceptable 
resolution to all in regards to the Iranian nuclear program.  Issues of spent fuel 
                                                             
294 Maleki, “Iran’s nuclear file: Recommendations for the future,” p. 108. 
 
295 Ibid. 
 
296 Entous, Adam. “Saudi Arms Deal Advances.” The Wall Street Journal. September 12, 2010. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704621204575488361149625050.html?KEYWORDS=sa
udi+weapons+deal (accessed September 22, 2010).  
 119 
 
reprocessing and take back, nuclear fuel guarantees, and even progress on the Arab-
Israeli conflict for which Iran’s behavior must be addressed.  Additionally, Israel must be 
convinced to restrain from taking action against Iran and potentially declare their nuclear 
arsenal.  The time will come for Israel to voice its concerns over Iranian threats against 
Israel, but they must permit the U.S. and world powers to barter with Iran without the 
threat of military action.  The roadmap laid out above presents what I contend are the 
most critical steps to finding a consensus that: A) ensures the order the international 
community, including Israel, seeks with an Iran free of nuclear weapons and B) provides 
Iran the justice they seek to  pursue their right to a peaceful nuclear program without 
threats from other states. 
 
What’s in it for Iran? 
 So why should Iran cooperate with the United States and its allies in their quest to 
halt Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear program and potentially nuclear weapons?  There are 
several important reasons that can answer this question and provide ample justification 
for cooperation.  To put it bluntly, Iran stands to profit considerably by cooperating, both 
economically and in security.  The potential gains are very substantial and would provide 
Iran with the ability to secure the state’s future position in the international community. 
 As discussed earlier, natural resources make up an enormous portion of Iran’s 
economy.  Export revenues and the budget itself are heavily dependent on oil.  While 
sanctions have had little impact on Iran’s nuclear program, they did wreak havoc on 
Iran’s oil infrastructure as discussed earlier.  Cooperating with the U.S. and its allies 
would promote a removal of these sanctions thereby permitting U.S. companies, who 
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have the most advanced technology in the energy sector, to help Iran extract the oil and 
natural gas that their economy is so dependent upon.  This support would not only 
provide direct monetary support to the state, but it would also provide jobs to everyday 
Iranians.  Obviously the benefit of the thousands of jobs these contracts would provide 
would have positive secondary and tertiary effects for the state of Iran.   
 Iran has several energy projects, to include the exploration in the Pars gas fields, 
that would benefit from advanced U.S. technology.  It would help Iran meet their rising 
energy demands, and allow Iran to use those funds previously used for importing oil on 
other state projects.  At a minimum, cooperation would mean that Iran could begin 
receiving the financial assistance to rebuild its degraded oil infrastructure and eventually 
increasing their exports thereby increasing their revenues.  So this is an obvious benefit 
that should be flaunted by U.S. policy makers, and it should be regarded as a game 
changer for the Iranians.  This cooperation with the U.S. in the areas of energy 
technology would free Iran to “expand export of its natural gas and petroleum.”297 
 Second, cooperation with the U.S. could bring benefits in other areas of common 
interests.  As liberals in International Relations would argue, cooperation breeds more 
cooperation, and there are several areas of regional security that both the U.S. and Iran 
agree upon.  Iran supported the U.S. in 2001 in the removal of the Taliban from 
Afghanistan, and they do not want to witness their return.  Iran has also had to deal with 
the problems of the drug trafficking out of Afghanistan and its impacts on Iranian 
citizens; this is another area where the U.S. and its agencies could provide valuable 
assistance.  The U.S. and Iran also want to see a stable Iraq; neither want to see the state 
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fall back into chaos and disarray as it did in 2006 and 2007.  The U.S. and Iran can work 
together to ensure a democratic Iraq that is not in jeopardy of foregoing its Arab identity 
to follow the Iranian theocratic model.  The U.S. and Iran can work together on the issue 
of stabilizing the Afghan and Iraqi states, but the nuclear issue must progress before 
future efforts .  Both these security and the previous economic reasons should provide 
Iranian leaders with sufficient reason to cooperate with the United States in the arena of 
their nuclear weapons program. 
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The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",  
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and 
the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take 
measures to safeguard the security of peoples,  
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger 
of nuclear war,  
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the 
conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,  
Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy 
Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,  
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the 
application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards 
system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special 
fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic 
points,  
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, 
including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States 
from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful 
purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear weapon 
States,  
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to 
participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute 
alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications 
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,  
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the 
nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear 
disarmament,  
Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,  
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear 
weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to 
achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to 
continue negotiations to this end,  
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust 
between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, 
the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals 
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of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,  
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of 
international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for 
armaments of the worlds human and economic resources,  
Have agreed as follows:  
Article I 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, 
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or 
explosive devices.  
Article II  
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer 
from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or 
of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; 
and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices.  
Article III 
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as 
set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and the Agencys safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of 
the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing 
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed 
with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, 
processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The 
safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its 
jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.  
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2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special 
fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the 
processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon 
State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be 
subject to the safeguards required by this article.  
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to 
comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or 
technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of 
peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and 
equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes 
in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth 
in the Preamble of the Treaty.  
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either 
individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence 
within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing 
their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such 
agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall 
enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.  
Article IV 
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the 
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this 
Treaty.  
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, 
the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to 
do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or 
international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States 
Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the 
world.  
Article V 
Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in 
accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through 
appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of 
nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the 
Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive 
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devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and 
development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such 
benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an 
appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon 
States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty 
enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also 
obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.  
Article VI 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict 
and effective international control.  
Article VII 
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional 
treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective 
territories.  
Article VIII 
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any 
proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall 
circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or 
more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a 
conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an 
amendment.  
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the 
Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty 
and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the 
Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall 
enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the 
amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the 
Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the 
Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members 
of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it 
shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification 
of the amendment.  
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty 
shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with 
a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are 
being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty 
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may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the 
convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of 
the Treaty.  
Article IX 
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the 
Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may 
accede to it at any time.  
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of 
ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the 
United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary 
Governments.  
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of 
which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this 
Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, 
a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or 
other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.  
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to 
the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of 
their instruments of ratification or accession.  
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States 
of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of 
accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any 
requests for convening a conference or other notices.  
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 
of the Charter of the United Nations.  
Article X 
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from 
the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this 
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such 
withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council 
three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary 
events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.  
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be 
convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be 
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extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a 
majority of the Parties to the Treaty.  
Article XI 
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are 
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly 
certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the 
Governments of the signatory and acceding States. 
 
Source: www.UN.org 
 
